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ARTICLE
THE HOW AND WHY
OF THE NEW PUBLIC CORPORATION
TAX SHELTER COMPLIANCE NORM
Susan Cleary Morse*
INTRODUCTION

Tax fraud. Tax shelters. Aggressive tax planning. Figuring out the line
between acceptable and unacceptable activity presents a challenge for every
tax decision maker, and overseeing these choices involves not just
substantive tax regulation, but attention to the decision-making process.
This Article reviews how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tax and
securities enforcement efforts, and tax shelter regulation have impacted
corporate tax decision making. Using the example of promoted tax shelters,
the Article argues that context and culture, in addition to substantive rules,
determine the impact of tax regulation on organizations such as large
corporations.
Practitioner comments and surveys indicate the emergence of new norms
at public corporations:
*

Compliance (including compliance with tax accounting standards and
with Sarbanes-Oxley internal control requirements) has replaced tax
planning as the number-one project of public corporation tax
departments. I

Teaching Fellow, Santa Clara University School of Law. Previously, Ms. Morse practiced
tax law with Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati in Palo Alto and with Ropes & Gray in
Boston. The author gratefully acknowledges comments from Bill Black, June Carbone,
David Hasen, Stu Karlinsky, Deborah Nolan, Kandis Scott, and Bernard Wolfman; the
participants in theconglomerate.org Junior Scholars' Workshop, particularly Mike Guttentag,
Kristin Hickman, and Claire Hill; and the participants in the Santa Clara University School
of Law works-in-progress series, particularly Brad Joondeph and Jeff Kahn.
1. See Brad L. Brown & James Wolfrom, SOX 404: Year Two 21 (Nov. 7, 2005)
(unpublished PowerPoint presentation for San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute
High Technology Tax Institute, Nov. 7-Nov. 8, 2005) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review) (citing survey results of KPMG showing financial reporting, Sarbanes-Oxley, and
tax return compliance as the top three priorities and effective tax rate management as the
fourth); see also Tax Council Policy Inst., The Corporate Tax Practice in the Age of
Transparency: A Path Forward (Feb. 3, 2006) [hereinafter TCPI 2006 Survey] (unpublished
market research study, on file with the Fordham Law Review). The TCPI 2006 Survey
solicited responses from the tax directors of the Fortune 500 from December 2005 to January
*
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Tax directors and tax advisors worry more than before about personal
liability, firm liability, 2 and/or adverse publicity 3 resulting from tax or
accounting noncompliance.
Marketing tax shelters to public corporations is no longer big

2006 and received 123 responses. Id. at 4. The survey showed that the top priority of
Fortune 500 tax directors is avoiding a financial statement error and that the second priority
is achieving financial statement benefits such as a reduced effective tax rate. Id. at 11. The
survey states that its results have a margin of error of plus or minus nine percentage points at
the ninety-five percent confidence level. Id. at 5.
2. Employees worry, for example, that they may be scapegoated by employers seeking
to avoid criminal prosecution at the firm level. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson,
Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components & U.S. Att'ys (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter
Thompson
Memo],
available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/
corporate__guidelines.htm (outlining "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations"); see also, e.g., Daniel Fisher & Peter Lattman, Ratted Out, Forbes, July 4,
2005, at 49, 49-50 (reporting that the Justice Department's policy of encouraging employer
cooperation can result in the employer's fingering of employees and the refusal to cooperate
in the employees' defense efforts); Letter from Current and Former KPMG Bd. Members &
Wash. Nat'l Tax Partners to Wall St. J. et al. (Aug. 10, 2005) [hereinafter KPMG
Anonymous Letter] (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (criticizing KPMG for deciding
to save the firm by entering into a deferred prosecution agreement, for failing to take
responsibility for top-level firm decisions with respect to the tax shelter business, and for
firing and refusing to help KPMG partners with legal fees in connection with defense of civil
or criminal litigation).
3. See, e.g., Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax TransparencyDynamics, Tax Notes Today,
Apr. 1, 2006, availableat LEXIS, 2006 TNT 69-10 ("Companies are now more concerned
than they have ever been about the diminution of their 'brand value' arising from the
disclosure of breakdowns in corporate governance processes, including those related to tax
transactions. In an Ernst & Young LLP survey of global tax directors, 70 percent said that
'reputational consequence,' should a strategy become public, is a very important factor in
their tax planning analysis. This has translated into a more conservative approach to all tax
planning, even when tax planning is related to an entirely appropriate business purpose, as it
must be.").
4. In September 2006, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Mark
Everson, stated flatly to a congressional committee, "No longer are abusive tax shelters
being marketed by top level accounting firms." Mark Everson, Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
Written Testimony Before Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee
et al.: Deconstructing the Tax Code: Uncollected Taxes and the Issue of Transparency
Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size Businesses 10 (Sept. 26, 2006),
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Everson926.pdf; see also Robert Goulder,
Current, Former IRS Officials See New Attitude in Corporate Tax Planning, Tax Notes
Today, Oct. 26, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 206-5 (reporting that IRS official
Deborah Butler has noticed the development of "a more conservative approach to strategic
tax planning"); Allen Kenney, Treasury, IRS Officials Discuss Shelter Crackdowns, Circular
230 Concerns, Tax Notes Today, June 30, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 125-2
(reporting government officials' praise for progress in "stamping out abusive tax shelters"
and their attribution of that progress to "stemming shelter promotion" (citing statements of
IRS Commissioner Mark Everson, IRS Chief Counsel Donald Korb, and acting Treasury
deputy assistant secretary for tax policy Eric Solomon)). Conversations with practitioners
confirm the observations of these government officials. See Rachel Emma Silverman, The
Search for a Safe Tax Shelter, Wall St. J., Oct. 13, 2005, at DI ("Big accounting and law
firms are being more cautious than in the past, shying away from marketing aggressive
shelters, especially those designed to generate losses."). At least one recent academic article
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Most of this Article focuses on a narrow compliance norm: public
corporations' current reluctance to participate in promoted tax shelter
transactions. In Part I, the Article describes the typical tax decision-making
group at a public corporation and identifies organizational behavior
concepts that help explain the emergence of the existing anti-tax shelter
norm. In Parts II through IV, the Article sets forth three elements that have
contributed to the development of this norm.
First, as discussed in Part II, Sarbanes-Oxley expanded the tax decisionmaking group and increased its transparency within the corporate
organization. Second, as described in Part III, this group is pulled toward a
compliance norm by the members' concerns about the liability of separate
These liability concerns stem from
firms to which they belong.
enforcement and publicity efforts in both tax and non-tax contexts, and the
concerns draw reinforcement from Sarbanes-Oxley requirements such as
financial statement certification and audit committee oversight. Third, as
outlined in Part IV, the government has clearly labeled certain transactions
unacceptable, making it straightforward for a compliance-oriented tax
decision-making group to exclude these transactions from their planning.
A typical economic analysis would explain these compliance
developments by framing the tax decision maker's choice as a comparison
of (1) the cost of paying tax to (2) the difference between the benefit of
avoiding the tax and the cost of the imposition of tax, interest, and
penalties, with the difference adjusted for the risk that the government will
successfully challenge the tax avoidance
strategy and perhaps adjusted for
5
aversion to risk and reputational loss.
The economic analysis predicts that increased taxpayer penaltieswhether existing penalties, 6 larger penalties, 7 or differently designed
also shifts focus away from the problem of tax shelters toward more diffuse tax compliance
issues. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising
Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 583, 586, 636-37 (2006)
(arguing that the government's enforcement efforts must expand beyond mass-marketed tax
shelters to customized, abusive tax planning). Meanwhile, the same Senate subcommittee
that investigated the corporate tax shelter industry several years ago, see infra note 141, has
shifted its focus to tax products targeted at individual investors, particularly those that shelter
assets in offshore tax havens. See Staff of S. Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm.
on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong., Tax Haven Abuses: The Enablers,
The Tools and Secrecy 1 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter Senate Subcommittee Report on
Tax

Havens],

available at

http://www.senate.gov/-levin/newsroom/supporting/2006/

PSI.taxhavenabuses.080106.pdf (describing the problem of tax evasion by U.S. citizens
through tax haven abuses).
5. See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of CorporateTax Selfishness, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 877,

881-82 (2004) (describing the standard model).
6. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem,
Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L. Rev. 325, 361 (2002)

(noting that most taxpayers believe that penalties will not be imposed).
7. See, e.g., Dep't of the Treasury, The Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters:
Discussion, Analysis and Legislative Proposals 109 (July 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Treasury
available at http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/papers/corp-shelter.pdf
Report],
(calling for a twenty-five percent excise tax on tax benefits earned from a tax shelter).
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penalties 8-will deter tax avoidance by directly increasing its cost. The
economic approach also suggests that disclosure will lead to more
compliance if disclosure produces more enforcement, both generally and
specifically with respect to a disclosing taxpayer. 9
This Article's story about tax compliance is consistent with the rational
taxpayer economic model. Increased enforcement efforts and publicity
increased the expected size of civil and criminal penalties for promoting tax
shelters considered abusive, by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Increased government efforts to identify and force disclosure of tax shelters
also raised the chance of discovery of such transactions.
However, this Article offers analyses of the story that do not fit neatly
into the rational economic taxpayer model. Part II argues that because tax
decision making at large corporations is a group exercise, group dynamics
impact the group's collective views-including compliance tendencies.
Part III contends that enforcement efforts wholly unrelated to tax have had a
positive impact on tax compliance because they produce general liability
concerns within organizations, including the corporate taxpayer itself,
accounting firms, and other advisors to which members of the tax decisionmaking group belong. Part IV discusses how a clear line between
acceptable and unacceptable behavior in the tax shelter area helps a
decision-making group avoid ethical uncertainty and reach consensus.
Part V acknowledges that this observed new norm is narrow.
Conservatism has not permeated every aspect of corporate taxpayer
behavior: Corporations, for example, continue to use creative tax planning
tools such as hybrid securities and offshore tax structures. Nevertheless,
Part V argues that the government can draw on organizational behavior
insights to encourage compliance beyond the promotion of tax shelters. As
an example of culturally sensitive regulation, Part V discusses the existing
Compliance Assurance Program (CAP) for large corporations.
Part V further posits that the observed new norm may be temporary. It
considers how the government could encourage more permanent,
noncyclical tax compliance norms. Finally, Part V briefly outlines the costbenefit issues raised by the regulatory approaches described in the Article.
I. THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TAx GROUP

A. The Tax Director'sOrganization
At a typical public corporation, the tax director has responsibility for
making or recommending tax decisions.
Such decisions relate to
8. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:
Deceit,
Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 571-72 (2006) (arguing

for a tax penalty scheme whereby taxpayers' penalties "vary inversely with the probability of
detection").
9. See Ronald A. Pearlman, Demystifying Disclosure: FirstSteps, 55 Tax. L. Rev. 289,
293-94 (2002) (listing tax policy, audit, and deterrence reasons for requiring disclosure).
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compliance, tax controversies, planning (for example, determining what
offshore structure optimizes the corporation's tax position), and financial
accounting (for example, calculating the tax provision, which is the figure
that describes the corporation's exposure to tax audit risk on its financial
statements). 10 The tax director might be a vice president (or have a similar
title) and typically reports to the corporation's chief financial officer
(CFO). I1
Depending on the size of the corporation, the tax director's staff can vary
from two or three individuals to twenty or more.1 2 The corporation's tax
department generally has responsibility for a range of taxes in addition to
federal income taxes, including state income taxes, sales and use taxes,
property taxes, customs and excise taxes, non-U.S. income taxes, and nonU.S. value added taxes. As a result, it is often a priority to recruit staff
members with
13 varying kinds of expertise, if only to cover routine returnfiling tasks.
With respect to the tax planning portion of the tax director's job, he or
she often engages outside accounting, law, or consulting firms as tax
planning advisors.' 4 Such experts may serve as ongoing consultants,
particularly with respect to financial accounting matters. They may also
advise on a specific project in a complex and market-sensitive area, such as
a corporate acquisition transaction, an offshore intellectual property (IP)
structure, or a transfer pricing plan.
The tax director also receives outside advice with respect to the financial
accounting portion of his or her job. For example, the tax director may
consult the tax experts at the corporation's financial accounting firm to
determine whether a particular tax planning exercise will result in a tax
benefit asset on the corporation's balance sheet. As another example, each
quarter the tax director typically confirms the corporation's calculation
estimating its tax audit exposure with the accounting firm. 15
Historically, the financial accounting firm has also provided tax planning
advice. Before Sarbanes-Oxley, particularly in the case of marketed tax
shelters, such consulting advice was cross-sold by accounting firms to their
audit clients under conditions involving significant conflicts of interest:
The offering of both tax and audit advice by the same firm to a client

10. See Tax Executives Inst., Inc., 2004-2005 Corporate Tax Department Survey 27-30
(2005) (reporting corporate tax department responsibilities).
11. See id. at 16-17 (reporting tax executives' titles and the individuals to whom the tax
executives report).
12. See id. at 21 (reporting the numbers of tax department staff).
13. See id. at 26 (noting numbers of employees assigned to different taxes and showing
that most filled compliance roles).
14. See id. at 27-28 (noting that thirty to fifty percent of tax departments outsourced
some or all of their planning).
15. Few tax directors outsource responsibility for calculating the tax provision. See id. at
29 (reporting that only five percent of tax directors outsourced their tax provision work).
However, securities law requirements result in an audit of all in-house numbers, at least for
public company financial statements.
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discouraged an independent and critical financial accounting review of the
client's tax planning. 16 As discussed in more detail below, since SarbanesOxley, tax directors often separate tax planning and financial accounting,
hiring independent law firms or other tax planners to provide the former
17
and relying on their audit firm for the latter.
In addition, under section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley ("Section 404"), the tax
director has another advisor: the Section 404 auditor. As discussed in Part
II.B.2 below, this auditor, who is often from the corporation's financial
accounting firm but who has a separate mandate under Sarbanes-Oxley,
vets the process by which the tax department reaches its decisions in order
to certify that the process meets applicable "internal controls" requirements.
some examination of the
The Section 404 audit frequently involves
8
substantive correctness of tax positions.'
This Article accordingly examines the development of norms within a
typical post-Sarbanes-Oxley public corporation tax decision-making group
anchored by at least four tax or accounting specialists: the tax director, the
outside law firm (or other tax planner), the financial auditor, and the Section
404 auditor. Each specialist identifies professionally with other entities.
The tax director works at the public corporation; the Section 404 auditor
and the financial auditor at the corporation's accounting firm; and the tax
planner at a law firm, accounting firm, or different consulting firm.
B. The Relevance of an Expanded and More TransparentGroup
The typical four-member public corporation tax decision-making group,
as described above, tends to be larger than the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley group
for two reasons. First, the public corporation's financial auditor is less
likely to provide tax planning advice. Second, the Section 404 auditor has
been added to the group.
Some organizational behavior texts consider group size and structure as
these characteristics relate to appropriate work assignments. These sources
suggest that groups with centralized structures are better at reaching quick,
correct decisions when facing simple issues; groups with decentralized
structures, where each member of the group talks to the other members, are
19
thought to be better at reaching the right decisions in complicated cases.
A group with a centralized "wheel" or "star" structure may have a key
decision maker at the center and a number of individuals feeding

16. See, e.g., Bernard Wolfman, Letter to the Editor, The Best Way to Protect Auditor

Independence, 89 Tax Notes 1779, 1779 (2000) (noting that a conflict of interest can result
not only from the provision of tax consulting services to an audit client, but also from selling
a tax product to a non-audit client, since "another tax product huckster" might peddle a
similar product).
17. See infra Part II.B. 1.
18. See infra Part II.B.2.
19. See, e.g., Laurie J. Mullins, Management and Organisational Behaviour 398-400 (2d
ed. 1989).
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information to that decision maker. 20 A decentralized or "all channel"
group is diagrammed as a polygon of some kind, where each person
21
communicates with each other person in the group.
The basic insight of the comparison between a "star" group and an "allchannel" group is that the contribution of a number of different viewpoints
is advantageous for solving complex problems. Anyone who has circulated
an academic article for review or run a tricky situation by a law-practice
colleague has acted on a similar instinct. In addition to capturing new ideas
from a variety of sources, the process of discussion may help the
participants to focus on the problem being discussed-rather
than on the
22
many other puzzles their brains constantly face.
An all-channel group also has the potential to increase information flow
if the members of the group themselves belong to different networks. A
related theory about organizational behavior considers "structural holes" in
organizations. In the corporate governance context, the application of this
social capital and economic sociology theory suggests that gaps between
social networks in a corporation create opportunities for individuals
bridging the gaps to control information and, consequently, to influence a
network's behavior. 23 For example, a chief executive officer (CEO) who is
the sole bridge between the social network of an independent board and the
social network of a corporation can benefit greatly from controlling the
information the board of directors receives (such as compensation
24
information).
Some pre-Sarbanes-Oxley decisions to promote tax shelters were
apparently made by the tax shelter promoter and the corporation, without
input from other advisors. 25 In contrast, after Sarbanes-Oxley, the typical
tax decision-making group contains at least four tax or accounting
specialists who bridge three major networks-those of the audit firm, the
tax planning firm, and the corporate tax department. Each group member's
ability to control information for his or her own purposes is accordingly
more limited. In addition, the increased internal transparency 26 of tax
20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Cf Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 1235, 1248-50 (2005) (describing neurological research indicating that the
brain must choose what problems to address and how carefully to consider decisions).
23. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies:

The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 Brook. L. Rev. 1313, 1323-26 (2005)
(summarizing Ronald Burt's theory).
24. See id. at 1348-50 (suggesting that independent boards are correlated with strong
CEOs).
25. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 216 (1999) (describing
a decision made by Compaq's Treasurer, Assistant Treasurer, and Chief Financial Officer
(CFO) to enter into a foreign tax credit generation transaction after the Treasurer and
Assistant Treasurer had a one-hour initial meeting with promoters from Twenty-First
Securities Corporation), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
26. Although "transparency" frequently means visibility of corporate decisions to
outside groups such as regulators or shareholders, this Article generally uses it to mean
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decisions at public corporations after Sarbanes-Oxley, attributable in large
part to audit committee oversight, 27 further limits a tax decision maker's
ability to control information.
C. Group Norm Development
The increased size of the tax decision-making group does not
automatically indicate increased compliance.
Organizational behavior
research has examined the phenomenon of group norms, or the "informal
rules that groups adopt to regulate... group members' behavior. '28
Several organizational behavior concepts are relevant here.
First, a group norm may take the form of a narrow legal norm or a
broader social norm. 29 These are distinguishable, 30 though legal rule
changes can prompt changes in both. 31 A narrow legal norm might produce
a monitoring and internal control system designed to effect purely rational,
economic calculations regarding the cost of compliance, the likelihood of
detection, and the level of penalties. 32 A social norm constitutes a broader
agreement that compliance is one of the social, or even moral, values of the
33
organization.
Second, even though a larger group has the potential to permit increased
sharing of information and more considered decisions, it also has the
capacity simply to adopt and exaggerate signals sent by senior members of

internal transparency, or visibility of decisions made by small groups within a large
organization to the rest of the organization.
27. See infra Part II.C.
28. Daniel C. Feldman,

The Development and Enforcement of Group Norms, in

Management & Organizational Behavior Classics 241, 241 (Michael T. Matteson & John M.
Ivancevich eds., 7th ed. 1999).

29. Cf Barry D. Baysinger, Organization Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 341, 349-50 (1991) (stating that management influences

organizational norm development both through direct "indoctrination," or "strategic
controls," and through the selection of output measurement standards for judging work, or
"financial controls").
30. See Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1955, 1960-61 (2001)

(distinguishing between legal compliance and extralegal norms, and arguing that the two are
complementary).
31. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 33 (2000) (noting that changes in
the law can amend both people's behavior and their beliefs); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The
Limits of Social Norms, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1537, 1544 (2000) (noting that law can
produce social norm changes).
32. See, e.g., Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 Temp. L.
Rev. 451, 473 (2003) ("[E]vidence of compliance-oriented firm policies and structures is
equally consistent with the deterrence model. Even a strictly rational firm would comply

with some regulations, and thus would need mechanisms to identify the 'right' rules with
which to comply and to make sure that those obligations are met.").
33. See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law andEconomics, 27 J. Leg. Stud. 585, 607 (1998)

("Law provides an instrument for changing social norms by expressing commitments.");
Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253, 1262-63

(1999) (describing social norms rooted in "belief systems"); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms
and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 914 (1996) (attributing "social attitudes of
approval and disapproval" to social norms).
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the group. Organizational behavior literature suggests that group norms
within a business organization develop as a result of negotiation between
the members of the group, which is heavily influenced by the views of
leaders of the organization. 34 Group norms may differ from individual
norms, and in particular may amplify them. 35 Professor Cass Sunstein has
described group members' tendency to defer to information offered by
others instead of disclosing their own information, especially when the
offeror of information is a peer or supervisor and adverse 36reputational
sanctions might result from putting forth different information.
In other words, Sunstein argues, groups tend to amplify information or
results supplied early in a discussion by a senior member of the groupwhether the information or results are good or bad-and groups often arrive
at a more extreme consensus relative to the individual view initially
offered. 37 Professor Donald Langevoort offers the example of large
corporations' tendency to develop optimism
biases that lead to
38
overcommitment and overbidding for assets.
Third, both positive and detrimental group norms can develop. Positive
and production-encouraging group norms may include rules of etiquette (be
prompt; don't interrupt) and performance standards (do the work assigned
by the deadline; be ready to back up conclusions with good data). They are
essential to the successful performance of a group. Conversely, detrimental
39
group norms may develop that hinder or block a group's effectiveness.
This Article does not contend that the recent tax shelter compliance norm
is a broad social norm, as opposed to a narrow legal norm. Furthermore,
the Article acknowledges that the observed norm may result from
amplification of group leaders' signals. But, in contrast to other analyses of
group norms observed in corporate settings, this Article contends that the
observed tax shelter compliance norm is a positive norm-or at least one
that conforms to regulators' objectives. Accordingly, the same reasons for
34. See, e.g., James G. March & Herbert A. Simon, Organizations 99-100 (2d ed. 1993)
(noting that individual members of work ,groups can exert pressure on norm development
and that disproportionate weight may be accorded to norms to which more group members
subscribe and norms held by senior group members); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A.
Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We Identify a CorporateMorality, 76 Tul.
L. Rev. 1645, 1663 (2002) (contending that "individuals are psychologically constrained by
their corporate roles"); cf Feldman, supra note 28, at 225-26 (discussing how superiors and
departmental colleagues can exert great pressure on an individual).
35. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. Pa.

L. Rev. 101, 131 (1997) (noting that corporations themselves "develop belief systemsshared ways of interpreting themselves, their environments, their pasts, and their prospects").
36. See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and

Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 966 (2005) (identifying "informational
influences" and "social pressures").
37. See id. at 1012-13 (noting the "polarization" process and "cascades").
38. See Langevoort, supra note 35, at 139-40 (stating that business organizations often
amplify optimism bias).
39. See, e.g., id. at 155-56 (discussing how optimism, as a group norm, can both
facilitate productive behavior and discourage it).
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the development of aggressive or risk-taking firm norms can also support
the development of compliance norms. In particular, amplification of
senior group members' views surely occurs in public corporation tax
decision-making groups. But if each member of the group is inclined
toward compliance as a result of the priorities of leaders at each member's
firm, increased compliance is the amplified consensus. In other words, the
group dynamic can work in the regulator's favor.
In order to unravel the development of this positive dynamic, it is useful
to examine the typically cited reasons for the bluffing of individual norms
as group norms develop. First, some note that the de-emphasis of
individual norms coincides with the decrease in personal responsibility for
decisions made by a group. 40 Second, corporations are hierarchies, and
disagreement with one's superior on ethical (or other) matters can cause
adverse results ranging from exclusion from social conversations to job
loss. 4 1 Third, commentators have observed that managers often face
uncertain dilemmas, where
the ethical path is not clearly distinguishable
42
from the unethical path.
D. The Relevance of Liability and Enforcement
The first two reasons that individual norms are blurred in a group
setting--decreased personal responsibility and hierarchy-make individual
ethics in corporations contingent on the ethics of the corporation. The
ethics of the corporation, in turn, are often expressed through the views of
superiors within the corporation. In particular, with respect to the four tax
or accounting specialists considered in this Article-the tax director, tax
planner, financial auditor, and Section 404 auditor-each belongs to a
distinct firm that provides top-down guidance to the individual tax
specialist on the appropriate priority of ethical or "compliance"
40. See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Conflicting Agendas: Personal Morality in Institutional
Settings 61 (1994) (commenting that the decrease in personal responsibility diminishes the
tension between individual morality and group norms); see also Langevoort, supra note 35,
at 137-38 (noting that "groups are motivated to preserve cohesiveness" when the members
share decision-making responsibility).
41. See Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes 45 (1988) ("For most managers, however, future
chances in an organization, after the crucial break points in a career are reached, are seen to
depend not on competence nor on performance as such. Instead, managers see success
depending principally on meeting social criteria established by the authority and political
alignments-that is, by the fealty and alliance structure-and by the ethos and style of the
corporation."); see also John M. Darley, The Dynamics of Authority Influence in
Organizations and the Unintended Action Consequences, in Social Influences on Ethical

Behavior in Organizations 37, 38-39 (John M. Darley, David M. Messick & Tom R. Tyler
eds., 2001) (noting that authority hierarchies help to influence individuals to commit acts
they otherwise would not).
42. See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 29, at 354 (noting the uncertainty of the boundary
between legal and illegal behavior, especially for less-senior employees); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated Governance, 81 Wash. U.

L.Q. 487, 542-43 (2003) (arguing that inevitable gaps in compliance rules leave room for
self-interested groups, including regulated corporations and their legal advisers, to push their
own agendas).
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considerations. This top-down guidance will largely determine whether the
group defines a "better" decision as a more compliant decision.
The factors of decreased personal responsibility and hierarchy
accordingly explain the importance of recent tax and securities enforcement
efforts and practice-standard revisions to the development of a corporate tax
shelter compliance norm. Part III further discusses these developments. To
the extent that they generate real anxiety about personal and firm liability
among leaders of corporations, law firms, other tax planning firms, and
accounting firms, the leaders' focus on avoiding liability should prompt
subsidiary 43
decision-making groups like the tax group to prioritize
compliance.
This Article in fact observes such an emphasis on compliance,
particularly with respect to avoiding promoted tax shelters. 44 This postSarbanes-Oxley compliance contrasts sharply with other studies of harmful
corporate group dynamics. Professor Robert Jackall, for example, describes
norm development at corporations as an exercise in trading more ethical
individual norms for less ethical corporate norms. His analysis includes
discussion of a whistleblower who lost his job after reporting financial
accounting fraud, 45 an engineer who faced suspension after documenting
46
procedural shortcuts in the cleanup of the Three Mile Island nuclear site,
and corporate efforts to conceal both respiratory 48illness caused by cotton
dust 47 and ozone erosion caused by formaldehyde.
Similarly, Professor Donald Langevoort has written extensively about the
"groupthink" phenomenon and other cognitive biases within corporations,
in an effort to explain securities fraud and other harmful activities. 4 9 He
argues that corporations suffer from "optimism bias" and points out that
groups give individuals a strong disincentive to "introduce stressful
dissonant information into a group setting once the group has implicitly
agreed to think otherwise. ''50 The resulting conformity and dislike for
43. Some note, however, that the process by which organizations communicate a topdown desire for increased ethics or compliance is complex and imperfect, in part because of
the inevitable simultaneous focus on measurable output metrics. See, e.g., Baysinger, supra
note 29, at 362-63 (citing NASA's experience with the 1986 Challenger disaster as an
example of the difficulty of institutionalizing safety norms); Malloy, supra note 32, at 491
(suggesting that information flow problems interfere with compliance efforts).
44. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
45. See Jackall, supra note 41, at 105-11.
46. See id. at 112-18.

47. See id. at 156-61.
48. See id. at 177-78.
49. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Epistemology of Corporate-SecuritiesLawyering:
Beliefs, Biases and OrganizationalBehavior, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629, 639-642 (1997) (citing
cognitive simplification, optimism, and commitment as reasons why corporations overlook
bad news and underestimate risk); Langevoort, supra note 35, at 138-39 (noting that groups'
desire to preserve cohesiveness can explain institutional decision making that leaves out
important information (citing Irving Janis, Victims of Groupthink 8 (1972))).
50. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taking Myths Seriously: An Essayfor Lawyers, 74 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 1569, 1578 (2000) (describing groups' tendencies to think positively in the
context of a discussion about the importance of myth in organizations).
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negative information encourages groups
to make riskier, less conservative
51
decisions than individuals would make.
Case studies of business responses to regulation note the tension between
profit-motivated business norms, which are related to the harmful
tendencies identified by Jackall and Langevoort, and regulation-responsive
compliance norms.
For example, Professors Ian Ayres and John
Braithwaite conclude after examining a series of case studies that business
managers can be influenced both by internal or social compliance norms
and by profit-seeking norms, which may often point in opposite
directions. 52 Ayres and Braithwaite state that in light of these different
incentives, both forgiveness (for well-meaning firms with strong
compliance norms) and ferocity (for rationally calculating firms influenced
53
mainly by profit-seeking norms) are appropriate regulatory tools.
The recently developed tax shelter compliance norm in public
corporations, however, finds support not only in individual managers'
underlying commitment to law-abiding behavior, but also in the consensus
and conformity tendencies identified by Jackall and Langevoort as typical
factors in the creation of harmful group norms. In particular, all four tax or
accounting specialists-the tax director, tax planner, Section 404 auditor,
and financial auditor-have reason to advocate compliance as a result of
concern about personal liability for aggressive planning. Moreover, the
interaction of these individuals, each with an independent reason to fear
liability, works to overcome the tendency to discount the risk of
enforcement (optimism bias) and contributes to the development of a
compliance consensus and of an anti-tax shelter group norm.
E. The Relevance of a Clear Government Message
The third factor noted at the end of Part I.C as a contributing factor to the
blurring of individual norms within an organization is the uncertainty of the
legal or ethical path. In a group decision-making context, such uncertainty
can permit other goals-such as profit or self-interest-to push the ethical
interpretation exercise to its limit. 54 In the tax area, ongoing tax shelter

controversies amply illustrate the difficulty of determining whether a
55
certain tax product is illegal.
Moreover, in the area of corporate tax compliance, the clarity of the line
between acceptable and unacceptable activities is of particular importance.
Despite some evidence that individuals believe that paying taxes is a moral
51. See also Baysinger, supra note 29, at 353-54 (citing optimism bias as a reason why
corporations may commit crime).
52. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation:

Transcending the

Deregulation Debate 21-29 (1992) (noting a variety of motivations); see also Malloy, supra
note 32, at 474-75 (noting evidence of compliance norm development within business firms
in other regulatory response case studies).
53. See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 52, at 26-27.
54. See, e.g., Baysinger, supra note 29, at 354.
55. See infra Part IV.B. 1 (describing tax shelter litigation).
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obligation, 56 such an obligation can quickly become obscured, particularly
in the corporate context, by the complexity of the rules that determine the
amount of tax due and by the57uncertainty about how the government will
interpret and enforce the rules.
Clear rules, as opposed to broad standards, have potential disadvantages,
such as extreme complexity and narrowness. 58 Nevertheless, in the
promoted tax shelter context, clear rules appear to have achieved good
results. As discussed in Part IV, the unequivocal government disapproval
of promoted tax shelters limits the impact of other decision factors and
provides a clear course of action that the members of the tax decisionmaking group can agree on: Do not engage in promoted tax shelter
59
transactions, especially those that are listed as such.
II. How SARBANES-OXLEY PRODUCED AND EXPANDED A MORE
TRANSPARENT TAX DECISION-MAKING GROUP

A. Sarbanes-Oxley Overview
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act 60 emerged from a highly charged political
atmosphere where decision makers were motivated to take action by wellpublicized scandals and a bear stock market. 6 1 Some commentators have
pointed out that the enactors of Sarbanes-Oxley did not pay much attention
to academic empirical evidence and theoretical research relating to the
56. See Slemrod, supra note 5; at 883 (noting significant "experimental and empirical
evidence" of noneconomic taxpayer motives such as civic duty and trust in the fairness of
the tax system); see also Robert W. McGee, The Ethics of Tax Evasion: A Survey of
International Business Academics 24-39 (Feb. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-803964 (reporting survey results indicating that business
professors believed tax evasion was unethical even where government engaged in
objectionable or even reprehensible acts); Pew Research Ctr., A Barometer of Modem
Morals:
Sex, Drugs and the 1040, at 1 (Mar. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/Morality.pdf (reporting that seventy-nine
percent of survey respondents believed that "not reporting all income on your taxes" was
morally wrong).
57. See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 883 (noting that corporations frame the tax compliance
question as a matter of tax avoidance, or "creative compliance," not tax evasion); id. at 884
("To be sure, creative compliance is facilitated because the tax law is exceedingly complex
and open to alternative interpretations, and this undoubtedly facilitates ethical
rationalizations of positions taken.").
58. See infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Part IV.B.3.
60. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(to be codified as amended at scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
61. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40
Hous. L. Rev. 1, 45-48 (2003) (explaining that Republican legislators hastily dropped their
opposition to the already-pending Democratic bill in the face of an electorate unhappy about
falling stock prices and apparent corporate governance failures); Roberta Romano, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521,
1543-44 (2005) (noting lack of attention to relevant research, pressure on Congress to act on
corporate fraud in an election year, and weakness of accounting and business lobbies in light
of contemporaneous scandals such as Enron).

974

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

likely success of various regulatory approaches. 62 Others have criticized
the Act's failure to impose strict liability penalties on, or otherwise raise the
stakes for, the professionals auditing and advising corporations. 63 But the
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the composition and internal transparency of
public corporation tax decision-making groups demonstrates the potential
benefits of at least some provisions enacted as part of that legislation.
Sarbanes-Oxley includes a new oversight board for the accounting
profession; various disclosure, audit, and governance rules intended to
encourage corporate responsibility; specific rules to promote director and
auditor independence; and provisions imposing or increasing criminal
penalties for actions including document destruction and fraud. 64 With few
exceptions, Sarbanes-Oxley does not attempt to distinguish substantively
between appropriate and inappropriate transactions. 65 For example, the
new oversight board, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) 66 does not have responsibility for developing substantive rules
under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) continues to make GAAP rules after
67
Sarbanes-Oxley.
62. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 61, at 1535-37 (contending that nineteen of twentyfive available empirical studies found no link between audit quality and prohibitions on
auditor provision of non-audit services); id. at 1541-43 (stating that two available empirical
studies of the value of officer certification of financial statements give ambiguous results);
see also Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 25, 35-45 (2002) (discussing
perceived costs of increased regulation).
63. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 349-353 (2004) (proposing better
alignment of gatekeeper and shareholder incentives through a regulatory regime imposing
strict liability on gatekeepers); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors' Incentives, 35
Conn. L. Rev. 989, 1008-12 (2003) (reviewing the alternate approaches of mandatory audit
firm rotation, statutory auditors and financial statement insurance); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposalfor a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79
Wash. U. L.Q. 491, 540 (2001) (recommending contractual strict liability based on portion
of issuer damages); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The
FinancialStatement InsuranceAlternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 413, 42729 (2004) (evaluating the financial statement insurance alternative). Accounting firms often
include liability caps and arbitration provisions in their engagement agreements. See Michael
Rapoport, Auditing "LiabilityCaps " Face Fire, Wall St. J., Nov. 28, 2005, at C3 (reporting
that some investors object to the caps).
64. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (And It Just Might Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 941-43 (2003) (summarizing
Sarbanes-Oxley); Hamilton, supra note 61, at 56-69 (cataloguing Sarbanes-Oxley
provisions).
65. For an example of an exception, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k) (Supp. III 2003) (codifying
Section 402(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, which prohibits issuers from extending certain personal
loans to executives).
66. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-17, 7219 (codifying provisions from Title I of SarbanesOxley that establish the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (permitting private entities to set "generally accepted"
accounting principles). The rule projects of the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) show the effects of recent events, however. See, e.g., infra Part IV.C (regarding
accounting for uncertain tax positions).
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B. Sarbanes-Oxley Provisionsthat Expand the Tax Decision-Making
Group
Two Sarbanes-Oxley provisions in particular have impacted the tax
limitations on non-audit services and internal
decision-making group:
68
control requirements.
1. Non-Audit Services Limitations
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits an audit firm from providing tax services to a
client without prior approval from the client's independent audit
committee. 69 Further, more restrictive rules promulgated by the PCAOB
flatly prohibit accounting firms from providing (and cross-selling) certain
kinds of tax services to their audit clients. 70 Specifically, these PCAOB
rules forbid the provision of advice related to the implementation of any
transaction (1) listed as a shelter by the IRS, 7 1 (2) defined as a confidential
transaction by the IRS, 72 (3) involving the provision of certain 74aggressive
tax advice, 73 or (4) provided under a contingent fee arrangement.
There is evidence that the restrictions on non-audit services have had real
effects in the market. In particular, even before the PCAOB finalized the
rules described above, one study of public filings suggested that public
corporations had significantly modified their consumption of tax services

68. See David E. Hardesty, Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance in the Corporate Tax
Department, State Tax Today, Nov. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, 2004 STT 229-3
(analyzing non-audit services rules and Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley (Section 404)).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(h), (i) (codifying a portion of Section 201(a) and Section 202
of Sarbanes-Oxley). Prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, audit firms had divested many
consulting units. See Cunningham, supra note 64, at 953-54 (commenting on Ernst &
Young's sale to Cap Gemini, PricewaterhouseCoopers's sale to IBM, KPMG's initial public
offering/spin-off, and Deloitte & Touche's planned split-off). These spin-offs, however,
generally did not involve the separation of tax consulting services from audit operations;
instead, they focused on other consulting areas such as information technology.
70. See Press Release, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (PCAOB), Board Adopts
Standard on Remediation of Material Weaknesses, Rules on Auditor Independence and Tax
Services (July 26, 2005), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News-andEvents/News/
2005/07-26.aspx (announcing the finalization of PCAOB Rules 3520-24); see also Emily
Davis, New PCAOB Rules Target Tax Shelters, Tax Notes Today, July 29, 2005, availableat
LEXIS, 2005 TNT 145-5.
71. See Bylaws & Rules of the Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., R. 3522 (2006),
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules-of the -Board/All.pdf (treating an auditor
as not independent if it markets, plans, or opines with respect to any listed transaction as
defined in Treasury regulations).
72. See id. R. 3522(a) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or
opines with respect to any confidential transaction as defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(3)
(2006)).
73. See id. R. 3522(b) (treating an auditor as not independent if it markets, plans or
opines with respect to any transaction recommended by the firm that has a significant
purpose of tax avoidance and if the transaction is more likely than impermissible under
relevant tax law).
74. See id. R. 3521 (treating an auditor as not independent if it has any contingent fee
arrangement, including one relating to tax advice).
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by seeking those services from advisors other than their auditors. 75 One
2005 survey indicated that forty-one percent of public corporations now
76
prohibit their audit firms from providing them with any tax services.
Another survey indicated that audit firms are often prohibited from
provide
providing any tax work to their audit clients and, even if they do
77
some tax work, are typically not the largest tax services provider.
Corporations have, then, often responded to the non-audit services rules
by adding a tax planning advisor from a different firm to the typical public
corporation tax decision-making group. The cited data sources do not
carefully distinguish between routine tax services such as uncontroversial
tax return preparation and more involved tax planning, such as offshore tax
structuring, transfer pricing, state tax planning, or tax structuring in
connection with a business transaction such as an acquisition, joint venture,
or financing. But a more pronounced shift within corporations toward
seeking advice in the latter, more uncertain or riskier planning categories
would be consistent with the PCAOB rules, which focus on tax planning as
opposed to return preparation.
2. Section 404
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 requires public corporations to establish,
document, and have audited "internal controls" ensuring accurate financial
Commentators have sharply criticized the higher-thanreporting. 78
expected costs of the internal control rule 79 and its confusing and
75. See Edward L. Maydew & Douglas A. Shackelford, The Changing Role ofAuditors
in Corporate Tax Planning 19-20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
11504, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/Wl1504 (showing that the ratio of
audit fees to tax fees provided by the same firm had increased from approximately 1:1 in
2001 to approximately 4:1 in 2004). Although an increase in audit fees as a result of internal
control and other compliance also influences this data, Professors Maydew and Shackelford
record the same trend for 2003, before companies began to incur Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance costs. See id. The authors also present evidence that tax fees remain strong,
although they tend to be earned from clients other than audit clients. See id. at 21-24; see
also Tax Executives Inst., Inc., supra note 10, at A-41 (reporting results showing that fortysix percent of surveyed companies subject to Sarbanes-Oxley reduced their use of external
audit firms for tax work after Sarbanes-Oxley, and fourteen percent of such companies
reported that they would no longer use an audit firm for tax services).
76. See KPMG, 2005 Tax Department Survey: Executive Summary 4 (2005), available
(reporting
at http://www.us.kpmg.com/RutUS-prod/Documents/9/Tax-Survey-2005.pdf
results of a telephone survey of tax directors at ninety-eight "major U.S. corporations" in
June and July 2005).
77. See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 19 (reporting that fifty-six percent of
responding tax directors used their external audit firm for some tax work but not as the
primary tax services provider, while twenty-seven percent did not use their external auditor
for any tax work).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. III 2003).
79. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) estimated the costs of internal
control compliance at $91,000 per company or $1.24 billion total annually. See
Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8618, 68 Fed.
Reg. 36,636, 36,657 (June 18, 2003). But surveys demonstrate that the actual cost is
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overinclusive drafting.8 0 However, it appears to provide some synergies
with the regulation of tax planning.
The rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
implementing Section 404 call for a "control framework that is established
by a body or group that has followed due-process procedures, including the
broad distribution of the framework for public comment. 8 1 In practice,
companies rely on the internal control framework compiled by a consortium
of accounting practice groups called the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO). 82

The COSO

standard is process oriented and elaborate. It features a three-part process
significantly higher, even for years subsequent to the initial year of compliance. See David
Reilly, Internal-Control Help Becomes Less Costly, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at C3
(reporting average internal and external cost for all companies as $860,000 according to a
survey by the Big Four accounting firms); Fin. Executives Int'l (FEI), FEI Survey on
Sarbanes-Oxley
Section
404
Implementation
2
(Mar.
2006),
available at
http://www.fei.org/membersonly/FEI_404-Survey-4-2006.pdf (reporting that the average
internal and external compliance costs in 2005 for a larger accelerated filer company were
estimated to be approximately $3.8 million). The high cost of internal control compliance
has apparently led to going-private transactions. See Ehud Kamar, Pinar Karaca-Mandic &
Eric Talley, Going-PrivateDecisions and the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002: A Cross-Country
Analysis 56-57 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. in Law, Econ. and Org., Research Paper No. C06-5;
Univ. of S. Cal. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-10, 2006), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-901769 (reporting the empirical finding that the rate of
acquisition of small public companies increased in the year after the passage of SarbanesOxley). It may also have discouraged non-U.S. corporations from listing shares on U.S.
exchanges. See, e.g., Francesco Guerrera & Andrei Postelnicu, A Not So Foreign Exchange:
China Shuns the West as a Locationfor its Big CorporateShare Offers, Fin. Times, Nov. 18,
2005, at 17 (reporting that Chinese companies avoid listing on New York-based stock
exchanges in part to avoid the burdens of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).
In partial response to these concerns, the SEC extended the effective date of the Section
404 internal control provisions for corporations whose market capitalization is less than $75
million. See Management's Report on Internal Controls over Financial Reporting and
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Companies that Are Not
Accelerated Filers, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8618, 70 Fed. Reg. 56,825 (Sept. 22,
2005). An SEC advisory committee has recommended tailoring Sarbanes-Oxley to small
businesses, including exempting smaller companies from internal controls requirements. See
generally Exposure Draft of Final Report of Advisory Committee on Smaller Public
Companies, Exchange Act Release No. 33-8666, 71 Fed. Reg. 11,090, 11,107-08 (Apr. 23,
2006) [hereinafter SEC Smaller Company Advisory Committee Report] (providing
recommendations for "scaled" application of Rule 404 to smaller corporations, including the
reduction or elimination of external audit requirements). The SEC is considering taking such
actions. See, e.g., Rebecca Buckman & Kara Scannell, Do U.S. Regulations Drive Away
Start-Ups?, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C5 (reporting SEC officials' apparent willingness
to consider tailoring internal control requirements).
80. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Fixing 404, 105 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2007)
(manuscript at 7-10 (Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford, Working Paper No.
06-01, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/soxcomp/jagrundfest050106.pdf)
(noting that the internal control statute requires the reporting of control failures that "raise a
more than remote likelihood of a more than inconsequential misstatement").
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(c) (2006); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-15(c) (containing
the same language).
82. See SEC Smaller Company Advisory Committee Report, supra note 79, at 11099
(identifying and briefly describing the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the
Treadway Commission (COSO) standard).
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reconciliations), information capture
including controls (e.g., reviews and
83
and communication and monitoring.
Section 404 auditors assess the tax department's ability to catch law
changes on a quarterly 84 or more current basis, correctly record notoriously
elusive intercompany transaction data, and document the tax department's
decisions about reporting transactions with memos or opinions from
relevant advisors. 85 Section 404 auditors describe a testing process for tax
matters that involves zeroing in on the "key review person" (the besieged
tax director), asking that person how he or she makes decisions, and then
inspecting records to ensure that the outlined approach (for example, the
reconciliation of book and tax numbers, memos that relate to particular
transactions, and the documentation of intercompany transactions such as
transfer pricing) is in fact followed. 86 In a 2004 survey, a large majority of
responding tax directors reported that "some additional effort" or a "major
effort" would be required for their tax department to comply with Section
404.87

A Section 404 review may88 result in the identification of internal red flag
"significant
deficiencies"
and/or publicly reported
"material
89
that
in
2005,
over 200
weaknesses" related to tax. One source reports
material weaknesses and thirty-one percent of adverse internal control
opinions were tax-related. 90 According to the Chairman of the SEC, tax
issues are the second most frequent cause of material weaknesses (after

83. See COSO, Internal Control-Integrated Framework Executive Summary,
(last
http://www.coso.org/publications/executive-summary-integrated-framework.htm
visited Oct. 17, 2006) (providing an overview of the COSO internal control approach).
84. The focus on quarterly reporting finds reinforcement in the Sarbanes-Oxley
requirement that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and CFOs certify quarterly and annual
financial reports. See infra Part II.C.
85. See Hardesty, supra note 68, nn. 7-21 and accompanying text (outlining the Section
404 internal evaluation and external audit requirements).
86. James Wolfrom, Partner, Ernst & Young, Presentation at the San Jose State
University/Tax Executives Institute High Technology Tax Institute: The Latest on SOX 404
(Nov. 7, 2005) (explaining the "testing script").
87. Tax Council Policy Inst., Emerging Tax Issues of the Fortune 500, at 7 (Feb. 2,
2004) [hereinafter TCPI 2004 Survey] (unpublished market research study, on file with the
Fordham Law Review) (reporting that sixty-three percent of respondents indicated that
"some additional effort" would be required to implement Section 404 in their tax department
while twenty-six percent indicated that "a major effort" would be necessary). The TCPI
2004 Survey solicited responses from the tax directors of the Fortune 500 from December
2003 to January 2004 and received 125 responses. Id. at 3. The survey indicated that its
results have a margin of error of plus or minus nine percentage points at the ninety-five
percent confidence level. Id. at 4.
88. Significant deficiencies are known as "minor blows" in the inevitable accounting
firm parlance. Brad Brown, Partner, Tax. Mgmt. Solutions,: KPMG, Presentation at the San
Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute High Technology Tax Institute: The Latest on
SOX 404 (Nov. 7, 2005).
89. Material weaknesses are also referred to as "major blows." Id.
90. See Allen Shoulders, PracticalApproaches to Improving Tax Control Effectiveness,
Tax Notes Today, Apr. 26, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 80-37 (reporting results
from an Ernst & Young examination of public records and from an Audit Analytics study).
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revenue recognition). 91 Another source reports that up to one-third of tax
directors whose companies reported a tax-related material weakness left
their jobs. 92 Whether or not specific issues are identified as problems, the
fact that a conversation must occur about these matters with the Section 404
auditor makes the Section 404 auditor a member of the tax decision-making
93
group and increases the internal transparency of that group's decisions.
C. Sarbanes-OxleyProvisions that Increase the Tax Decision-Making
Group'sInternal Transparency

Other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are designed to ensure review of tax
director (and other manager) decisions by senior managers and the board.
One such provision requires CEOs and CFOs to certify quarterly financial
reports. 94 An officer who knowingly or willfully falsely certifies that a
report is fair and materially complete faces criminal penalties. 95 This
quarterly certification requirement has produced sub-certification practices
at some companies, which require managers including the tax director to
sign certification statements with respect to their areas of responsibility on a
96
quarterly basis.
Another relevant Sarbanes-Oxley provision is audit committee review of
financial statements. 9 7 The statute requires an audit committee comprised
of independent members of the corporation's board of directors. 98 This
committee must collect and review reports from the corporation's auditor
regarding "critical accounting policies and practices" and possible
alternative GAAP-compliant accounting treatments. 99 The certification and

91. See Christopher Cox, Chairman of the Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the
Seventh Annual Tax Policy and Practice Symposium: The Corporate Tax Practice: New
Challenges (Feb. 9-10, 2006), in Taxes, June 2006, at 49, 49-50. Practitioners report that the
most significant tax internal control issues include problems in the process for recording the
deferred tax asset position or performing book and tax reconciliation; staffing shortages,
including those related to a failure to "separate the three key functions of transaction
authorization, transaction recording, and handling of assets," and errors in accounting for
unusual or complex transactions or foreign operations. Shoulders, supra note 90.
92. Brad Brown, Partner, Tax Mgmt. Solutions, KPMG & James Wolfrom, Partner,
Ernst & Young, Presentation at the San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute High
Technology Tax Institute: The Latest on SOX 404 (Nov. 7, 2005).
93. See infra Part II.D (describing the erosion of attorney-client and other privileges).
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. III 2003) (requiring quarterly certifications as to the
correctness and completeness of financial reports and internal controls).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (Supp. III 2003) (providing criminal penalties including
fines up to $1,000,000 or imprisonment of up to ten years).
96. See TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note 87, at 5 (reporting that nineteen percent of tax
director respondents faced sub-certification requirements and that seventy-eight percent
experienced new information collection procedures).
97. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(k) (requiring public corporation auditors to make reports to
audit committees).
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (requiring listed issuers to have an independent audit
committee and mandating that to be independent, the members of the audit committee may
not accept "any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer").
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(k).
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audit committee oversight reinforce the top-down tendency of norm
development within corporations, which was discussed in Part I, and add a
statutorily mandated compliance element to that chain of command.
Practitioner observations indicate that these provisions have in fact
resulted in increased oversight from corporations' audit committees. 0 0 Tax
directors report that material or substantive tax items or items that arise in
Section 404 audits often receive specific audit committee review. 10 1 Audit
committee reactions may include asking for a second opinion or increasing
the opinion standard required before approving the transaction.
Don Korb, who currently serves as IRS Chief Counsel, made the
following observation about his private practice experience with a postSarbanes-Oxley audit committee:
Sarbanes-Oxley created the milieu, created the meeting. Those guys [on
the audit committee] didn't know anything about the rule that the IRS put
out. What they understood was they better pay attention to what... is
going on. So that's why the meeting happened. And then the
professional [Korb] shows up and explains to them that even though this
[proposed transaction] might work...
they still faced this risk.., and
02
they made a judgment not to do it.
D. Internal TransparencyBegets External Transparency
One result of increased internal control regulation and increased audit
committee oversight is that financial and Section 404 auditors demand more
information about tax planning.' 03 A 2004 PCAOB release further

100. See, e.g., Ernst & Young Analyzes Tax Transparency Dynamics, supra note 3
("Perhaps the most tangible sign of how companies have responded to the new environment
is the re-emergence of strong oversight and active involvement of public company audit
committees in all aspects of financial risk management, including tax risk management.
Audit committees are asking more questions about tax[, including] such matter[s] as risk
profile, critical accounting policies embedded in tax decisions and the status of potential tax
controversies.").
101. See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 34 (reporting that audit committee reviewed
material tax items in eighty-two percent of cases, substantive tax issues in sixty-three percent
of cases, and tax elements of Section 404 reports in fifty-nine percent of cases). The tax
director may or may not meet regularly with the audit committee. See Tax Executives Inst.,
Inc., supra note 10, at 20 (reporting survey results that forty-three percent of respondent
senior tax executives met with their companies' audit committees at least once a year).
102. Unofficial TranscriptIs Available of Forum on Tax Shelters, Tax Notes Today, Feb.
11, 2005, availableat LEXIS, 2005 TNT 40-63 (quoting Don Korb).
103. See Sheryl Stratton, Lawyers Discuss Postshelter Assault on Privilege, Tax Notes
Today, Apr. 14, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 71-5 (reporting on comments at an
ABA teleconference by former IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams, now in practice at
Shearman & Sterling, who stated that auditors demand more information to support the tax
provision after Sarbanes-Oxley and that attorney efforts to resist handing over information in
the interest of protecting attorney-client privilege did not always succeed); Thomas W.
White, The Growing Tension Between Auditors and Lawyers, Directors Monthly, Oct. 2004,
at 8, 10, available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/b8clbb7b-7c5d-4cl l8b9a-5e91633c70b3/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/f3000b03-2d3d-4c4f-b37b-f814cd
8ce 1a3/Growing%20Tension.pdf (reporting a "tug-of-war among auditors and attorneys" as
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contributes to this development by requiring audit documentation that
provides the "basis for the auditor's conclusions concerning every relevant
financial statement assertion." 10 4 The leading trade group for accountants,
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) backs this
broad standard by specifically anticipating auditors' access to opinions of
concerns regarding attorneyoutside counsel "notwithstanding 10potential
5
client or other forms of privilege."'
Disclosure of tax planning advice to auditors and audit committee
examination of tax planning increases the transparency of tax decisions
within the corporation and among its advisors. But there is a broader
transparency effect as well, since such disclosure waives any attorney-client
or accountant-client privilege with respect to such advice 10 6 (although
work-product protection may remain in some cases). 10 7 There is no
10 8
accountant-client privilege protecting audit workpapers from disclosure.
A recently added section of the tax code purports to provide a tax

a result of auditor information and representation requests that significantly exceeded the
standard requests of the past thirty or so years). In a 2004 survey, seventy-three percent of
responding tax directors responded that their "level of documented support for tax
contingency reserves [had] increased in the past two years." TCPI 2004 Survey, supra note
87, at 10. A 2006 survey showed that seventy-four percent of responding tax directors had
provided outside counsel tax opinions to auditors. TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 23.
available
at
(June
9,
2004),
104. PCAOB,
Release
2004-006
http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/docket_ 012/2004-06-09_release_2004-006.pdf.
105. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, Interim Auditing Standards § 9326.2.22
available at
http://www.pcaobus.org/standards/interim-standards/auditing(2003),
standards/au_9326.html.
106. According to the classic Wigmore formulation of the attorney-client privilege,
[w]here legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence
by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure by himself
or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961). The client may waive the privilege
by disclosing it to a third person outside the attorney-client relationship, such as an auditor or
even the government in a tax return or other filing. See, e.g., United States v. Lawless, 709
F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that a tax return filing waived privilege).
107. There is no automatic waiver of the work-product privilege in the event of disclosure
to a third party other than the adversary. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 287 F. Supp. 2d
461, 464, 468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (concluding that Martha Stewart's disclosure to her
daughter of her attorney's communication waived the attorney-client privilege but not the
work-product privilege). Instead, the availability of the work-product doctrine depends on
whether the material was developed in anticipation of litigation, whether the material is
essential to the preparation of the opponent's case, and whether the opponent will suffer
undue hardship without access to the materials. See Bernard Wolfman, James P. Holden &
Kenneth L. Harris, Standards of Tax Practice § 306.4.4.2, at 304 (6th ed. 2004) (describing
the work-product doctrine). One recent case may support more expansive work-product
protection claims. See United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2006)
(concluding that work-product protection could apply to a KPMG opinion issued in part to
protect against understatement penalties).
108. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-19 (1984) (noting that
prior case law confirmed that no accountant-client testimonial privilege existed and
reversing the Second Circuit's conclusion that the work-product privilege could cover
auditor workpapers).
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practitioner-client privilege that gives some protection for tax advice given
by accountants.1 09 However, recent cases in the tax shelter context have
established a narrow scope for the statutory accountant-client privilege and
have indicated that the attorney-client and tax practitioner-client privileges
often do not apply to tax advice, such as when the advisor acts in a
promoter capacity rather than a legal advisor capacity" 0 or when the
1
advisor prepares tax returns. II
These developments lead many practitioners to believe that their work
generally will not enjoy any privilege protection. 112 One might expect that
practitioners would avoid putting legal advice in writing as a result of such
privilege concerns (and also because heightened opinion standards make
written advice more expensive). 1 3 Such a reluctance to provide written
advice might decrease, rather than increase, communication and internal
transparency. But although the reaction of requesting less written advice
has been observed, it does not clearly prevail. 114 Perhaps auditors'
demands for documentation still mandate written advice for tax matters
with material financial accounting consequences.

109. See I.R.C. § 7525 (West Supp. 2006) (effective Oct. 22, 2004) (extending "some
common law protections of confidentiality" in the attorney-client privilege context to tax
practitioners).
110. See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Wachovia Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 627, 635-36 (W.D.N.C. 2003)
(requiring disclosure of client identity in response to IRS summonses; no privilege existed
between Jenkens & Gilchrist or KPMG and clients because Jenkins & Gilchrist and KPMG
did not provide individualized tax or legal advice but rather marketed identical tax shelter
packages).
111. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 502 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J.)
(stating in dictum that nothing in section 7525 of the Internal Revenue Service (Code)
"suggests that these nonlawyer practitioners are entitled to privilege when they are doing
other than lawyers' work"); United States v. KPMG LLP, 237 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D.D.C.
2002) (concluding that advice relating to tax return preparation provided by accountants is
not privileged).
112. See, e.g., James M. Lynch, War of the [Tax] Worlds: Privilege Versus
Transparency, Taxes, Mar. 2004, at 89, 89 (2004); Stratton, supra note 103 (reporting
comments at an April 13 teleconference sponsored by the ABA); see also Bruce Kayle, The
Tax Adviser's Privilege in TransactionalMatters: A Synopsis and a Suggestion, 54 Tax
Law. 509, 531-53 (2001) (noting that a tax lawyer's transactional advice may be
unprivileged due to disclosure to other parties in the negotiation or characterization as
business or accounting advice instead of legal advice).
113. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing Circular 230 developments).
114. A 2006 survey showed that seventy-six percent of responding tax directors had
"significantly changed [their] practice regarding documenting tax reserves in the last two
years" and that seventy-four percent had provided outside counsel tax opinions to auditors.
TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 23. It is not clear from the survey data, however,
whether they increased or decreased their demand for written advice. The same report noted
that of the thirteen tax director respondents who had experienced increased government
demand for information and made a change as a result, ninety-two percent only asked for
written advice when absolutely necessary; and that of the twenty-five tax director
respondents who had experienced increased government demand for information and not
made a change as a result, seventy-two percent believed that the need for a written record
was more important than the risk of possible disclosure of privileged information. See id. at
29, 30.
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E. What CausalEffect Does Sarbanes-Oxley Have on Tax Compliance?
This Article argues that the larger and more visible post-Sarbanes-Oxley
tax decision-making group amplifies the compliance tendencies of each of
its members. These compliance tendencies depend in part on the possibility
of tax-related significant deficiencies or material weaknesses under Section
404, which carry adverse reputational consequences, including possible loss
of employment for the tax director. 1 5
They also depend on the
enforcement measures and professional standards described in Part III.
Some of the enforcement elements described in Part III (such as Circular
230 enforcement standards) directly impact members of the tax decisionmaking group. Others (such as prominent criminal cases against CEOs in
connection with accounting scandals) do not directly impact such group
members. Nevertheless, the enforcement efforts have an indirect effect
because of the strong influence that organization leaders (like CEOs) exert
16
on their subordinates (like tax directors).'
This Article does not offer rigorous empirical proof that Sarbanes-Oxley
is a necessary piece of the tax shelter compliance puzzle. Nevertheless, the
story of a larger and more transparent group with amplified compliance
tendencies fostered by enforcement squares with the descriptions given by
practitioners and government officials. Current government officials cite
Sarbanes-Oxley as a factor that facilitates their efforts to increase public
companies' tax compliance.1 7 Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, the IRS and
Treasury reported frustration with their efforts to crack down on promoted
tax shelters (although the relevant tax shelter rules were also changed in
2002).'18 Larry Langdon, the former Commissioner of the IRS Large and
Mid-Size Business Division (LMSB) who is now in private practice, has
observed that a strong anti-tax shelter norm does not appear in private
corporations not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley. 1 9 Likewise, congressional

115. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that some tax directors left their

jobs after reporting material tax weaknesses).
116. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (noting the importance of leaders' ethics
in forming group ethics).
117. See Deborah M. Nolan, LMSB's Compliance Assurance Program (CAP): One Year
Later, 58 Tax Executive 26, 26 (2006) (noting that CAP "is structured to leverage new

corporate governance and financial reporting requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act"); Frontline, Tax Me If You Can:
Will the Shelter Problem Return?,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tax/shelter/return.html

(last visited Oct. 14,

2006) ("'Congress... has moved forward with Sarbanes-Oxley, and boards of directors and
professionals are certainly much more reticent to enter into some of these transactions.'
(quoting Mark Everson, IRS Commissioner, 2003-present)).

118. See infra note 247 and accompanying text (noting frustration with pre-2002
regulations' effectiveness).
119. See Frontline, supra note 117 ("'I think, in large measure, [the tax shelter problem]
has been licked for listed corporations because of Sarbanes-Oxley. I think we still have a
major challenge with wealthy individuals, small companies, and private companies, because
the lack of disclosure in those arenas still allows all the things we talked about with regard to
promoters selling things to people and getting away with it."' (quoting interview with Larry
Langdon, IRS Commissioner, Large and Midsize Business Division, 1999-2003)).
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attention has recently focused on the persistent problem of tax shelters for
wealthy individuals-who have apparently not been deterred from
participating in transactions that have been targeted by the IRS in the
compliance
past. 120 Finally, survey evidence shows that Sarbanes-Oxley
12 1
requires a significant share of tax directors' energy and time.

III. WHY TAx DECISION MAKERS Now WORRY ABOUT PERSONAL AND
FIRM LIABILITY

The expanded and more transparent tax decision-making group described
in Part II did not alone foster the development of a tax compliance norm.
The group norm development literature discussed in Part I indicates that
decreased personal responsibility and corporate hierarchy can allow
corporate norms to overrule individual norms. 122 Moreover, as described in
Part I, corporate norms often display aggressive, risk-taking tendencies due
to organizational behavior phenomena such as optimism bias.1 23 Parts I and
II alone might suggest that groups whose work is transparent within an
organization may more efficiently experience pressure to develop group
norms that favor profit seeking (or effective tax rate minimization) over
compliance. This Part explains the reasons for the liability and adverse
publicity concerns of the members of the tax decision-making group and the
people for whom they work. These concerns contribute significantly to the
compliance-oriented nature of the recently developed group norm. 124
A. CriminalProsecution and Other Enforcement Efforts Directedat
CorporateManagers
Numerous recent enforcement initiatives combine to make corporate
executives and managers worry about possible civil or criminal liability for
both themselves and their firms. Big criminal prosecutions and convictions
of top corporate managers have recently grown out of accounting and
126 HealthSouth, 127 Tyco, 12 8
securities fraud charges at Adelphia, 125 Enron,

120. See Senate Subcommittee Report on Tax Havens, supra note 4, at 17-28 (describing

activities through 2005 of an internet-based promoter equity development group, which
marketed off-the-shelf tax haven companies).
121.
122.
123.
124.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 1, 87 and accompanying text (summarizing survey evidence).
supra Part I.D.
id.
supra text accompanying note 1 (noting that corporate tax directors now

articulate compliance as a higher priority than effective tax rate reduction).
125. See Chad Bray, Adelphia Ex-Executive Avoids Jailfor False Report, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 4, 2006, at B4 (noting the convictions of John and Timothy Rigas for diverting funds

from Adelphia and misleading investors, their respective prison sentences of twenty and
fifteen years, and pending appeals).
126. See John R. Emshwiller, Gary McWilliams & Ann Davis, Lay, Skilling Are
Convicted of Fraud,Wall St. J., May 26, 2006, at Al (reporting the jury conviction).
127. See Chad Terhune, Ex-Finance Chief at HealthSouth Gets Five Years in Jail,Wall
St. J. Online, Dec. 10, 2005, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI13415352157818617.html

(reporting sentence of former HealthSouth CFO William T. Owens with respect to $2.7
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and Worldcom, 129 among others.

Some cases have also involved civil

federal charges and private lawsuits, generating significant monetary
penalties and settlements. 130
Some directors have made settlement
3
payments out of their own pockets.'1
Criminal and monetary penalties in these non-tax corporate manager
cases have particular impact on the corporate hierarchy and culture within
which the tax director works, because of the strong influence top executives
wield over the ethics of their subordinate managers and the corporation as a
whole. 132
Increased IRS audit and enforcement activity 133 aimed at
corporate taxpayers have also directly impacted the tax director. Other
measures, discussed below in Part III.B, target gatekeepers such as tax
planners and auditors.

billion accounting fraud and also noting the acquittal of former HealthSouth CEO Richard
Scrushy despite William Owens's testimony against him).
128. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Ex-Chief and Aide Guilty of Looting Millions at Tyco,
N.Y. Times, June 18, 2005, at Al (reporting the conviction of former CEO L. Dennis
Kozlowski and former CFO Mark H. Swartz on securities fraud, grand larceny, conspiracy
and other charges). Both Kozlowski and Swartz are in prison and are appealing their
convictions. See Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial, Wall St. J. Online, Mar. 20, 2006,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 114288629608403242.html.
129. See Almar Latour, Shawn Young & Li Yuan, Ebbers is Convicted in Massive Fraud,
Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 2005, at Al (reporting jury conviction of former Worldcom CEO
Bernie Ebbers in connection with an $11 billion accounting fraud and noting the guilty plea
of former CFO Scott Sullivan as well as Ebbers's appeal plans). Ebbers received a sentence
of twenty-five years and Sullivan a sentence of five years. See Guilty, Not Guilty, Mistrial,
supra note 128 (providing a summary of conviction and sentencing results for prominent
white-collar defendants).
130. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Tyco to Pay $50 Million to Settle SEC Accounting Fraud
Charges, Wall St. J.,Apr. 18, 2006, at C2 (reporting the SEC settlement and noting that
Tyco still faces active shareholder litigation including a class-action lawsuit related to
accounting fraud). In some cases where offending corporations entered bankruptcy, classaction lawsuits against outside advisors have resulted in settlements. See, e.g., Gretchen
Morgenson, Bank of America Settles Lawsuit over WorldCom, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2005, at
C1 (reporting that Citigroup had agreed to pay $2.65 billion and Bank of America would pay
$460.5 million to settle a class action lawsuit brought by bondholders who alleged that the
bankers failed to fulfill their duty to investigate WorldCom's financial condition in
connection with offerings of WorldCom bonds).
131. See, e.g., Daniel Akst, Fining the DirectorsMisses the Mark, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21,
2005, § 3, at 6 (noting Worldcom director payments of $20 million and Enron director
payments of $13 million).
132. See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (discussing top-down ethical
influences in large organizations).
133. See Corporateand PartnershipEnforcement Issues: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Finance, 109th Cong. 3-8 (2006) (statement of Eileen J. O'Connor, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Tax Division) [hereinafter Statement of Eileen J. O'Connor), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/061306testeo.pdf
(attributing
the increased Tax Division civil litigation and workload to increased IRS enforcement); see
also IRS Officials Give Update on Audit Currency Efforts, Tax Notes Today, Feb. 10, 2006,
available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 28-4 (noting a report that audit currency had increased and
audit cycle time had decreased).
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B. Gatekeeper Liability: Criminal Enforcement, Civil Liability, and
Circular230
The idea of imposing liability on gatekeepers in an effort to prevent
principals from engaging in misconduct has enjoyed significant academic
135
attention. 134 The precise definition of "gatekeeper" is sometimes elusive,
but in the context of the tax decision-making group considered by this
Article, three of the four members-the tax planner, the financial auditor,
and the Section 404 auditor--qualify as agents who can "disrupt
misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers."' 36 Recent
enforcement efforts targeting gatekeepers increase the likelihood that they
will do so.
1. Criminal Prosecution of Gatekeepers
The criminal prosecution of Arthur Andersen on charges of obstruction
of justice in connection with the government's investigation of Enron
provides one example of this phenomenon. When the jury returned a guilty
verdict, 137 Andersen imploded. The U.S. Supreme Court's subsequent
reversal of the conviction 138 came too late to save the firm. 139 The harsh
fate of Anderson apparently deterred the government from mounting
another criminal prosecution against a similarly large audit firm KPMG for
promoting tax shelters. Instead, the government's criminal enforcement
efforts consisted of a deferred prosecution agreement with the firm and
criminal prosecution of individual employees.
KPMG was not alone in developing and marketing tax products in the
1990s, but other firms that did so made the decision to settle with the
government. 140 KPMG initially fought back. However, KPMG's defense
sagged in the face of emerging information, including a Senate minority
report, about KPMG's systematic tax product development and marketing
practices, its strategies to conceal the products' existence or details from the

134. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 63, at 308-11 (describing the gatekeeper concept and

possible pitfalls in reliance on gatekeepers); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The
Anatomy of a Third-PartyEnforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 53 (1986).

135. See Cunningham, supra note 63, at 417 n.6 (2004) (suggesting that the gatekeeper
label is imprecise and not very useful).
136. Kraakman, supra note 134, at 53.
137. See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 302 (5th Cir. 2004)
(affirming the jury's guilty verdict), rev'd, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
138. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (overruling a guilty
jury verdict on grounds that the jury instructions did not properly articulate the knowing
intent element of the obstruction of justice charge).
139. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Op-Ed., Over Before It Started, N.Y. Times, June 14,

2005, at A23 (stating that "Andersen was destroyed when it was indicted").
140. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, How an Accounting Firm Went from Resistance to
Resignation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2005, at A16 (noting early settlements of Ernst & Young
and PricewaterhouseCoopers).
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IRS and its cavalier dismissal of the likelihood that large penalties could be
14 1
imposed on the firm.
The Justice Department believed that it could sustain criminal charges
against the firm through evidence that KPMG had pushed fraudulent
transactions marked by untrue representations about business purposes and
the like. 142 But both parties knew of the risk that a criminal indictment
would ruin KPMG and knew that the demise of KPMG would have left
only three U.S.-based global accounting firms.14 3 Thus, the parties entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement, which drew heavily from the Justice
Department's corporate
cooperation blueprint articulated in its 2003
1
Thompson memo. a4
Under the agreement, KPMG must pay $456 million in return for the
Justice Department's promise not to pursue its prosecution of KPMG for
criminal fraud and conspiracy charges.145 KPMG also agreed to limitations
on its tax practice, such as heightened opinion letter standards and a
prohibition on marketing any "pre-packaged tax product" or providing any
confidential tax services. 146 Importantly, KPMG also agreed to "cooperate"
with the government. The cooperation agreement, following the Thompson
memo model, requires a waiver of attorney-client privilege and the
provision of any requested information, including information about current
1 47
and former KPMG partners and employees, to the government.
Criminal fraud and conspiracy charges were filed and are still pending
against sixteen former KPMG partners, one lawyer, and one investment
advisor. 14 8 One former KPMG partner has pled guilty. 149 With respect to

141. See Minority Staff of Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, S. Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong., U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants,
Lawyers, and Financial Professionals: Four KPMG Case Studies: FLIP, OPIS, BLIPS, and
SC2, at 7-16 (Comm. Print 2003), available at http://www.senate.gov/-govtaff/ files/sprt10834tax-shelters.pdf (describing KPMG's development, marketing, and
concealment of tax products); see also Tanina Rostain, Travails in Tax: KPMG and the TaxShelter Controversy, in Legal Ethics Stories 89, 108-17 (Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban
eds., 2006) (describing disclosures by KPMG whistleblower Michael Hamersley).
142. See Superseding Indictment at 9-10, United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. Sl 05 Cr. 888) (describing the elements of fraud including
false representations and statements in tax opinion letters).
143. See John R. Wilke, KPMG Faces Indictment Risk on Tax Shelters, Wall St. J., June
16, 2005, at Al (noting the Justice Department aversion to causing the collapse of another
accounting firm).
144. See Thompson Memo, supra note 2, pt. II.A.4 (listing "the corporation's...
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents" as an element to be considered in
determining whether to criminally charge a corporation).
145. See Letter from Justin S. Weddle et al., U.S. Att'ys, S. Dist. of N.Y., to Robert S.
Bennett, Att'y 2, 13-17 (Aug. 26, 2005) [hereinafter KPMG Deferred Prosecution
Agreement] (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (stating that KPMG will pay $456
million and that the government will delay and potentially dismiss criminal charges).
146. See id. at 4-9 (articulating the practice restrictions and standards).
147. See id. at 9-12 (detailing the cooperation agreement).
148. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, A Single Trial for 18 Named in Tax Shelters, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 5, 2006, at C3 (reporting on trial plans).
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the other individual criminal charges, the correct outcome is unclear, in part
50
because no court has passed on the legality of the underlying tax shelters. 1
The government responds to this charge by explaining that the underlying
legality does not matter in light of evidently false representations drafted by
KPMG and made by KPMG for attestation by its clients. 15 1 However,
because many of the false representations related to the existence of a "real"
business transaction, some commentators and the defense argue that the
representations boil down to a view about whether the underlying
transactions had enough substance in the first place and that the question of
whether the tax
shelters themselves were legal is the only appropriate
52
starting point.
Even if the individual defendants find vindication on substantive ground,
however, the pending criminal case against individual KPMG partners has
practitioners particularly worried because the government approach appears
to have weakened employers' willingness to protect their employees. 153 In
KPMG, the firm insulated itself from prosecution by identifying employees
as bad apples, withdrawing attorney fees and other support from them, and
waiving attorney-client privilege. Practitioners have responded with great
54
anxiety to the possibility of being scapegoated. 1
This government approach may have lost part of its bite: The judge in
the KPMG case ruled that government pressure on KPMG to withhold legal
support from its former partners violated the partners' constitutional rights
to substantive due process and assistance of counsel, 155 and the former
KPMG partners' lawsuit against KPMG for payment of legal fees is
149. See Lynnley Browning & Colin Moynihan, A Surprise in Tax Case on KPMG, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 28, 2006, at C1 (reporting the guilty plea of David Rivkin).
150. See Op-Ed., KPMG in Wonderland, Wall St. J., Oct. 6, 2005, at A14 ("The KPMG
case attempts to short-circuit the messy business of proving that a tax shelter is illegal by
using the power of prosecution to target the tax advisers directly. And by cutting them off
from the support of their firm through the threat of a death-sentence indictment of KPMG
itself, the government seems intent on compelling the accused to cop a plea or settle the case,
and so deny them their day in court.").
151. See Lynnley Browning, ProsecutorsLay Out the Case Against KPMG Defendants,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 2006, at C2 (stating the prosecutors' argument that the shelter
description in opinion letters was false and noting that the prosecutors sidestepped the
question of whether the transactions would be legitimate if in fact carried out in the way
described in the opinion letters).
152. See Robert Weisberg & David Mills, Op-Ed., A Very Strange Indictment, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 12, 2005, at A16 (criticizing the validity of the government's case).
153. See, e.g., Fisher & Lattman, supra note 2, at 50 (noting the danger of talking to inhouse attorneys).
154. See, e.g., KPMG Anonymous Letter, supra note 2, at 6-9 (reporting "random tax
partner firings" and accusing KPMG leaders of improperly shifting firmwide responsibility
to a small number of unfortunate individuals).
155. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(concluding that the Thompson Memo presumption that payment of fees indicates
unwillingness to cooperate interferes with defendants' right to a fair trial); id. at 356, 362
(concluding that KPMG defendants might reasonably expect legal fee assistance from
KPMG and that government interference with payment of such fees could violate the right to
counsel).
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pending. 156 But some commentators speculate that this may simply
encourage employers to make clear that they will not pay to defend criminal
or civil charges
brought against employees arising out of their
57
employment. 1
2. Monetary Penalties and Civil Litigation
The criminal prosecution and deferred prosecution agreement described
above is not the end of the matter for KPMG. The firm faces ongoing
private party fraud and malpractice claims.158 Proposed settlements amount
to hundreds of millions of dollars, 159 on top of the approximately $450
million that KPMG must pay in connection with its deferred prosecution
60
agreement. 1
Several of the Big Four accounting firms-which include Deloitte &
Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers-have also
faced stiff fines or other sanctions such as restrictions on individuals' ability
to practice in subsequent years. Settlements may arise from shareholder
class-action lawsuits 16 1 or SEC investigations. 162 The charges typically
relate to the audit firms' failure to catch and stop accounting irregularities.
These monetary settlements have been described as a recent trend,
representing a change developing in the last decade or so, 16 3 although firms
also reached large settlements in the early 1990s with respect to the savings

156. See David Reilly, KPMG Case Orderedto Trial on Legal Bills to Ex-officials, Wall
St. J., Sept. 7, 2006, at C4 (reporting the court's denial of KPMG's motion to dismiss).
157. See Posting of Peter J. Henning to White Collar Crime Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime blog/2006/06/kpmgsaftermath.html
(June 28, 2006) (noting the possibility of employers or their insurers explicitly limiting
future payment of legal fees).
158. See Jeff Bailey & Lynnley Browning, KPMG May Dodge One Bullet, Only to Face
Another, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2005, at Cl (noting pending civil litigation and potential
damages of hundreds of millions of dollars).
159. See David Reilly, KPMG Can 't Shake Lawsuit, as Investors Reject Settlement, Wall
St. J., Apr. 27, 2006, at C2 (reporting a proposed $195 million settlement in a class-action
case against KPMG and Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, which a number of class
members have rejected).
160. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, KPMG Units Agree to Pay to Settle MalpracticeSuits,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2004, at C2 (reporting a $115 million class action settlement relating to
Lemout & Hauspie alleged accounting irregularities which would apparently rank just
outside the top ten settlements by major accounting firms); Joseph B. Treaster, Ernst &
Young Says It Will Pay Millions to Settle a Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1999, at Al
(reporting a settlement with Cendant shareholders of $335 million).
162. See Floyd Norris, Ernst Partners Accept Limits on Audits, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25,
2003, at C1 (reporting that two Ernst & Young audit partners agreed to a settlement with the
SEC related to the firm's failure to detect accounting violations at Cendant Corporation and
that the settlement forbids the partners from auditing public companies).
163. See Feder, supra note 161 (noting that a KPMG settlement "reflects a trend in the
last decade in which major accounting firms have been drawn into-and paid large sums to
get released from-litigation growing out of major financial scandals").
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and loan debacle. 164 The apparently escalating anxiety of accountants is
captured, among other places, at a website launched in June 2000,
accountingmalpractice.com, which lists emerging reasons for increased
malpractice exposure and sells tools to reduce it.
3. Circular 230
The federal government's Circular 230 rules 165 set forth the standards
with which a tax advisor must comply in order to be eligible to practice
before the IRS by, for example, representing a client in an audit situation or
166
filing documents (beyond tax returns) on behalf of a client with the IRS.
The government has amended and updated Circular 230 several times in the
last several years. 167 Circular 230 sets forth threshold requirements for an
individual to be permitted to practice before the IRS, 168 articulates practice
standards, 169 describes reasons for disciplinary action, 170 and establishes
enforcement mechanisms which may lead, for example, to the sanction of
prohibition of future practice before the IRS. 17 1 An IRS sanction may
further lead to disbarment or revocation of a CPA license to practice, and
may prevent the sanctioned individual from participating in a partnership
172
with other, unsanctioned practitioners.
At least two recent developments in Circular 230 have received
significant practitioner attention. 173 The first relates to tax opinions, and
provides standards that "covered opinions" must meet in order to provide a

164. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Big Law and Auditing Firms to Pay Millions in S.& L.
Suit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1992, at Al (reporting significant settlement agreements from a
number of firms in connection with private and government actions for savings and loan
frauds).
165. Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service (Circular 230), 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2005).
166. See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 105.1.1, at 17-18 (describing
Circular 230's definition of "practice before the IRS").
167. See Steven R. Schneider, Steven R. Dixon & Mona L. Hymel, Impact of the New
Anti-Tax Shelter Rules on Non-Tax Shelter Lawyers and Accountants 6-7 (Feb. 2006)
(unpublished discussion paper), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-881898.
168. See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 105.1.2, at 19-22 (describing
categories of practitioners eligible to practice before the IRS, including attorneys and
certified public accountants).
169. See id. § 105.1.4, at 24-26 (listing practice requirements including due diligence,
avoidance of conflict of interest absent informed consent, and prohibition against signing a
return that contains a position that lacks a "realistic possibility of being sustained on the
merits unless the position is not frivolous and the position is adequately disclosed to the
Service").
170. See id. § 105.1.5.1, at 26-28 (listing reasons for disciplinary action including a
conviction of a felony or crime involving dishonesty, knowingly providing false information
to the IRS, knowingly or recklessly rendering a false tax opinion, or willfully violating any
provision of Circular 230).
171. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.50 (2005); see also Wolfrnan, Holden & Harris,
supra note 107, § 105.1.5, at 26 (describing enforcement measures).
172. See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 105.1.5, at 26.
173. See generally id. at 2-21 (Supp. 2006) (providing an overview of Circular 230
amendments).
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taxpayer with "reasonable cause" protection against penalties. 174 One
category of covered opinions is particularly broad: reliance opinions, which
constitute written advice that "concludes at a confidence level of at least
more likely than not... that one or more significant Federal tax issues
would be resolved in the taxpayer's favor."' 175 However, an opinion that
includes a disclaimer stating that the opinion may not be used to protect
17 7
against certain penalties 176 does not count as a covered reliance opinion.
A practitioner delivering a valid covered opinion must not rely on any
factual assumptions or representations that he or she should know are
unreasonable, 178 and the practitioner must provide a conclusion as to each
significant federal tax issue unless the client has agreed explicitly to
receiving a "limited scope opinion."' 179 These requirements of broad
investigation of facts and broad analysis of law make covered opinions
elaborate and expensive exercises. Furthermore, the broad definition of
reliance opinions has persuaded some practitioners that every e-mail
communication might be a reliance communication, giving rise to a
ubiquitous practice of placing Circular 230 disclaimers at the bottom of
every law firm e-mail. In an effort to take the communication out of the
"covered opinion" definition, these disclaimers state that advice therein may
180
not be used for penalty protection purposes.
The goal of the ubiquitous disclaimer is to avoid the possibility of
Circular 230 sanctions as a result of a covered opinion failing to meet the
applicable standards. As mentioned above, violations of Circular 230 can
lead to loss of the privilege of practicing before the IRS or to other
sanctions. Related penalties such as a prohibition against partnering with
another unsanctioned practitioner, loss of state-issued professional licenses,
or reputational harm can follow from IRS sanctions. Prior to the current

174. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35 (describing "covered opinion" requirements).

Under section 6664 of the Code, certain penalties applicable to underpayments do not apply
if the taxpayer demonstrates that it has acted in good faith and that there was reasonable
cause for its return position. See I.R.C. § 6664(c), (d) (West Supp. 2005). A tax opinion is
one common way of demonstrating reasonable cause.
175. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(b)(4)(i).

176. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6664(c) (providing that a taxpayer may avoid penalties under
sections 6662 and 6663 of the Code with "reasonable cause" and "good faith").
177. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(4)(ii) (providing a no-penalty-protection

carveout from the reliance opinion definition).
178. See id. § 10.35(c)(1) (detailing Circular 230 requirements regarding factual matters).
179. See id. § 10.35(c)(3) (detailing requirements regarding the evaluation of tax issues).
180. See Letter from Kimberly S. Blanchard, Chair, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, to
Mark W. Everson, IRS Comm'r, et al. (May 1, 2006), in NYSBA Tax Section Members
Submit Revised Version of Proposed Circular 230 Regs, Tax Notes Today, May 1, 2006,

available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 85-19 (noting the "nearly universal" practice of tax
practitioners to legend all written communications with a no-penalty-protection warning
since the promulgation of the present version of Circular 230). The same letter notes that the
no-penalty-protection warning may be inaccurate because no regulations under I.R.C. § 6664
have been issued to confirm that the requirements of Circular 230 will be followed for
purposes of imposing penalties on taxpayers (as opposed to enforcing practice standards for
tax advisors). See id.
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Circular 230 amendments, general professional ethics rules governed nontax shelter tax opinions 18 1 and tax shelter opinions were narrowly
defined, 182 so that the sanction of losing the privilege of practicing before
the IRS did not directly tie to opinion standards. Moreover, another revised
Circular 230 provision charges the persons responsible for tax practice
within a firm to ensure that others in the firm comply with Circular 230
83
rules.1

The second element of the Circular 230 overhaul that has attracted
significant attention is the development of a more aggressive and more
public enforcement office. The former Office of Practice was renamed the
Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and its staff doubled in size. 184
OPR reportedly wants to increase the impact of disciplinary procedures, in
part by pursuing prominent cases that it hopes can more broadly influence
practitioner behavior. 185 OPR has also taken the controversial step of
proposing public, not private, disciplinary proceedings when a case reaches
the administrative law judge stage. 186 The proposal has drawn significant
practitioner criticism because of the perceived in terrorem effect of
187
publicity.
Circular 230 is an important reason why one member of the tax decisionmaking group-the tax planner-feels an increased incentive to comply
with the law. The perceived broadening of responsibility for investigating a
client's facts and relevant law (at least for purposes of penalty protection
opinions) and the tougher and more public approach of OPR makes
practitioners worry about the possibility of enforcement. Moreover, the
provision establishing supervisory responsibility for tax practice leaders
plants this worry within the context of the firm hierarchy, making it more
likely that the Circular 230 concerns of a junior associate at a law firm, for
example, will be reinforced by interactions with the partner who leads the
firm's tax department.

181. Cf Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 503.2.1, at 418-19 (outlining

professional ethics rules).
182. See id. § 503.4.2.1, at 426-27 (providing the definition of tax shelter under the prior
rules).
183. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.36(a) (imposing responsibilities on tax practice
leaders).
184. See Schneider, Dixon & Hymel, supra note 167, at 41-42 (describing the new Office
of Professional Responsibility (OPR)).
185. See Dennis B. Drapkin, ABA Tax Section Submits Comments on Disciplinary
Procedures of IRS Office of Professional Responsibility, Tax Notes Today, Dec. 8, 2005,
available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 236-18 (reporting OPR's intention to shift its enforcement
focus).
186. See Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 71 Fed.
Reg. 6421, 6433 (proposed Feb. 8, 2006) (proposing Circular 230 § 10.72, which would
provide for open proceedings in general).
187. See, e.g., Sheryl Stratton, Transparency at the OPR: A Two-Way Street?, 110 Tax
Notes 580, 581-82 (2006) (describing comments of prominent practitioners that open
proceedings will permit the IRS to ruin a practitioner's reputation without regard to the
validity of the charge).
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C. Publicity

The media spotlight has shone on corporate scandals in recent years, and
this, too, makes tax decision makers anxious. Many of the authorities cited
in the immediately preceding sections are newspaper articles. Scandal is
big news, both general corporate scandal and tax-specific scandal.
A tax planner is always wary of Lee Sheppard, the intrepid reporter for
Tax Notes, and of her colleagues. But major newspaper reporters of late
also have been known to undertake detailed public record examinations in
search of a tax shelter story. 188 A recent bestseller by New York Times
reporter David Cay Johnston showcases investigative tax journalism with
chapters lambasting individual and company tax strategies such as Stanley
Works's proposed inversion transaction.1 89 A 2003 PBS Frontline report
on tax shelters also raised the issue's profile.' 90
The government plays more than a standby role in this media saga. The
government issues press releases about its pursuit of tax cheats, sometimes
based on settlement deals with taxpayers that include the taxpayer's waiver
of certain confidentiality rights.' 9 1 It publicizes settlement offers about tax
strategies whose legality has not yet been adjudicated-and then announces
the billions of dollars of revenue that result from the settlement offers. 19 2 It
publicized the KPMG case, and the details of that firm's deferred
prosecution deal.
The perceived increased possibility of adverse media attention has led
practitioners-including the Big Four accounting firms-to formally note
93
the adverse impact that tax planning can have on corporate reputation.'

188. See, e.g., Jonathan Weil, KPMG Used Its Own Shelter on Tax Return, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 14, 2005, at CI (naming KPMG and six other companies as purchasers of a particular
product marketed by KPMG).
189. See David Cay Johnston, Perfectly Legal 236-49 (2003).
190. Frontline: Tax Me If You Can (PBS television broadcast Feb. 19, 2004) (presenting
a corporate tax shelter expos&).
191. See O'Connor, supra note 133, at 21 (noting that the Justice Department's Tax
Division has begun issuing press releases with respect to civil and criminal cases during
O'Connor's tenure as its head); see also, e.g., Press Release, IRS, IRS Accepts Settlement
Offer on Contingent Liability Tax Shelter (Dec. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroon/article/0,,id=132350,00.html ("Hercules [taxpayer] has further
agreed to a limited waiver of the taxpayer privacy and anti-disclosure rules in connection
with this press release."). The Hercules settlement followed two prominent government
setbacks in contingent liability cases. See IRS Settles Hercules Contingent Liability Tax
Shelter
Case,
TaxProf
Blog,
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof blog/2004/12/
irssettles her.html (Dec. 16, 2004) (noting the unfavorable outcomes to the IRS in Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440-43 (2006), affig in part and rev 'g in part
340 F. Supp. 2d 621 (D. Md. 2004) and Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2006), vacating and remanding62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004)).
192. See infra notes 209-12 and accompanying text (describing tax shelter settlement
offers as announced by the IRS).
193. Martin A. Sullivan, Reputation or Lower Taxes?, 108 Tax Notes 981, 981 (2005)
(reporting on reports put out by each of the Big Four accounting firms and noting that the
focus of media and government attention is on "aggressive" or "socially irresponsible" but
not necessarily tax evasive behavior).
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Accounting firm papers describe successive trends in tax planning, from
costcutting in the 1980s to lowering effective tax rates in the 1990s to
protecting corporate reputation today. 194 And conference participants buzz
anxiously about the possibility of landing on the front page of The Wall
195

Street Journal.

IV. A CLEAR GOVERNMENT MESSAGE
In Part II, this Article described the emergence of an expanded and more
transparent public corporation tax decision-making group that amplified its
members' compliance tendencies. In Part III, this Article explained that
recent criminal enforcement, civil liability, professional standards, and
publicity efforts cause members of this decision-making group to worry
more about personal and firm liability. Part IV provides the final piece to
the organizational behavior puzzle regarding the recent tax compliance
norm at public corporations:
the clear government identification of
acceptable, and unacceptable, activities, particularly in the tax shelter area.
Part IV also explores the reactions of tax decision-making groups within
public corporations to a new financial accounting standard for uncertain tax
positions.
A. The Tax Shelter Problem
In the 1990s, major accounting and other tax advisory firms engaged in
significant tax shelter development and marketing efforts. The tax shelter
products typically involved hypertechnical readings of the Internal Revenue
Code or regulation provisions 196 and possessed a "cookie-cutter" quality:
Promoters could market them to many taxpayers. In the late 1990s, media
reports described heavily marketed strategies undertaken for tax reasons
alone, with no real business purpose. 197 In 1999, Treasury released a report
on shelters 198 that catalogued the available substantive provisions, 199

194. See, e.g., KPMG, Tax in the Boardroom: A Discussion Paper (2005), available at
http://www.kpmg.dk/getMedia.asp?mb-GUID=3AD62769-A89B-4697-87B4-1523E9F36D
C0.pdf.
195. See, e.g., John Brennan, Vice President, U.S. Income Tax, Hewlett Packard,
Presentation at the San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute High Technology Tax
Institute: Good Tax Planning Gone Bad (Nov. 8, 2005); see also Ernst & Young Analyzes
Tax Transparency Dynamics, supra note 3 ("Senior management and board members
sometimes refer to . . . 'The Wall Street Journal' factor. This is the fear of being the subject
of media coverage arising from a transaction, including a tax planning transaction, that might
raise the concerns of stakeholders ... and inflict damage to corporate reputations and stock
prices.").
196. See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 208.1, at 139 (contrasting
"present day corporate tax shelter[s]" with individual tax shelters of the 1970s and 1980s,
which made use of tax preferences contemplated by the Code or regulations).
197. See, e.g., Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-Rated Shelters, Forbes,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 198, 200 (describing the practice of aggressively marketing questionable
tax products).

198. See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 7.
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disclosure and penalty requirements,2 00 and case law doctrines limiting or
regulating tax shelters,20 1 as well as describing several types of transactions
that made the government hopping mad.
The "son-of-BOSS" loss generation transaction provides an example.
Each of the Big Four accounting firms marketed this or a similar transaction
between 1997 and 2000, often targeting taxpayers who had just sold
corporate stock at a gain. One variation featured the contribution of
offsetting positions (purchased for the purpose of engaging in the tax shelter
transaction) consisting of one position with built-in gain and one position
with built-in loss to a corporation or partnership. The net economic value
of the two positions taken together was close to zero; a taxpayer purchased
them for the purpose of engaging in the transaction at nominal cost. The
loss side of the position typically involved a contingent liability or an
interest component, which the taxpayer argued should not reduce the basis
of the corporate stock or partnership interest. The taxpayer took the
position that the basis of the stock or partnership interest increased by the
high basis of the built-in gain position, but did not decrease by the full
amount of the loss position. This position was rooted in a technical reading
of section 752 (in the case of a partnership interest) or section 358 (in the
case of corporate stock). Then the taxpayer sold the stock or partnership
interest, with its high basis, for its true, lower economic value, and claimed
a loss. 202
Promoters aggressively marketed tax shelter products. In one instance, a
shelter appropriate for S corporation shareholders was marketed through a
telemarketing firm that cold-called owners of S corporations throughout the
country. 203
Another marketing technique, appropriate for public
corporation tax directors, involved the cross-selling of tax product services
by audit partners who arranged meetings between the tax directors at their
audit clients and the tax consultants at the audit firm. The tax consultants
could propose products precisely tailored to the needs of the corporate
204
client, since those needs were well-known by the audit team.
At its peak in the late 1990s, tax product work may have represented as
much as ten percent of some accounting firms' global revenues and as much

199. Id. at 35-38 (giving examples of general anti-abuse provisions, specific statutory
responses to specific tax shelter problems, and statutory grants of broad regulatory
authority).
200. Id. at 58-76 (reviewing tax shelter registration and other requirements from the
1980s effort against personal tax shelters and a 1997 law strengthening penalties applicable
to corporate tax shelters).

201. Id. at 46-58 (outlining substance-over-form, step transaction, business purpose, and
economic substance doctrines).
202. See I.R.S. Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255; Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter
Problem, 57 Nat'l Tax J. 925, 926-27 (2004) (describing the "son-of-BOSS" shelter).
203. See S. Rep. No. 109-54, at 34, 39-40 (2005) (describing the KPMG telemarketing
center and its use in marketing the SC2 shelter).
204. See id. at 36-38 (describing the cooperation between tax product and audit teams in
designing and marketing products).
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as twenty-five percent of firms' revenues in the United States. 20 5 It also
resulted in significant losses to the U.S. fisc. Tax shelter revenue loss
measures are notoriously difficult to estimate, 2 06 but most attempts indicate
at least $10 billion annually during the late 1990S.207 The IRS estimated tax
losses at up to $85 billion from listed and non-listed transactions as of
September 30, 2003. 208 The results of tax shelter settlement offers made by
the IRS also give some idea of the magnitude of the losses. The son-ofBOSS 2004 settlement offer attracted 1200 taxpayers and generated $3.7
billion in taxes, interest, and penalties. 20 9 A settlement offer covering
numerous other shelters, which closed in January 2005, attracted an
2 10
estimated 2000 taxpayers and generated an estimated $2 billion.
Costs other than direct revenue loss also result from tax shelter
activity. 2 11 They include wasted time and money from uneconomic tax
planning and from resulting enforcement efforts, 2 12 increased complexity as
a result of statutory response to perceived abuse, 2 13 and the degeneration of
the voluntary compliance that underlies the U.S. income tax system (aside

205. See id. at 11-12 (reporting KPMG's worldwide revenue of $10.7 billion and
KPMG's U.S. revenue of $4 billion in 2002 and peak annual tax shelter revenue of $1.2
billion).
206. The difference between book and tax income is sometimes used as an accessible but
imperfect measure of corporate tax shelter activity. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika
Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value 2 (Mar. 20, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-689562 (using book-tax gap as a
proxy for tax avoidance). However, one recent study was unable to confirm the existence or
growth of tax sheltering activity based on an examination of book and tax income. See Gil B.
Manzon, Jr. & George A. Plesko, The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting
Measures of Income, 55 Tax L. Rev. 175, 177 (2002).
207. See Slemrod, supra note 5, at 880 & n.9 (citing an IRS contractor estimate of $14.5
to $18.4 billion in 1999 and Professor Bankman's 1999 estimate of $10 billion for abusive
shelters targeted at corporations and wealthy individuals). This amount is material, though
not overwhelming, in the context of the estimated $350 billion annual tax gap. See IRS
Announces Results of Study on Tax Gap, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 29, 2005, available at
LEXIS, 2005 TNT 60-5 (reporting that a three-year study called the National Research
Program found a tax gap of $312 to $353 billion in 2001 and that most of the tax gap derives
from underreporting noncompliance).
208. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO-04-104T, Challenges Remain in Combating
Abusive Tax Shelters 11 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04104t.pdf
[hereinafter GAO 2003 Report] (providing data and noting that potential tax loss amounts do
not consider reductions that might result during examination and appeal).
209. See IRS Announces Success of Taxpayer Settlement Initiatives, Tax Notes Today,
July 11, 2005, availableat LEXIS, 2005 TNT 132-7.
210. See Global Settlement Offer May Net 2,000 Taxpayers, $2 Billion, Everson Says,
Tax Notes Today, Mar. 28, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 59-1 (reporting results of
the settlement offered in I.R.S. Announcement 2005-80, 2005-46 I.R.B. 967).
211. See 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 7, at iv.
212. Some go so far as to assert that nearly all tax planning is worthless. See, e.g., David
A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L. Rev. 215, 222-25 (2002) (asserting
that tax planning is a negative externality although acknowledging that planning to avoid
taxpayer-adverse mistakes in the law may have value).
213. See James S. Eustice, Abusive Corporate Tax Shelters: Old "Brine" in New Bottles,
55 Tax L. Rev. 135, 161-62 (2002) (arguing that legislation often generates more problems
than it solves).
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from wage withholding) in the first place. With respect to the last point,
sociologists have noted the phenomenon of taxpayers drawing on and
copying one another's normative decisions, commenting that the "right"
decision from a taxpayer's perspective depends on context.
This
phenomenon is evidenced by empirical data suggesting that compliant
taxpayers believe that other taxpayers also comply, 2 14
while noncompliant
taxpayers believe that other taxpayers engage in fraud.
B. Drawingthe Tax Shelter Line
Having identified corporate tax shelters as a problem, the government
faced the task of how to attack them. When Treasury's report on The
Problem of Corporate Tax Shelters emerged in 1999,215 regulations such as
the requirement to register certain confidential corporate transactions with
"a significant purpose" of tax avoidance already existed, though they
(evidently) did not stem the corporate tax shelter tide. 2 16 More recently,
and contemporaneously with the Sarbanes-Oxley and enforcement
developments described in Parts III and IV, the government has used two
principal tools to define the line between acceptable business tax planning
and tax shelters. The first tool is litigation. The second tool is disclosure
regulations.
1. Litigation
The government has generally challenged alleged tax shelter transactions
with substance-over-form arguments. That is, the government claims that
the form of such transactions should not be respected because it lacks
economic substance or business purpose. 2 17 A full survey of recent
corporate tax shelter cases is beyond the scope of this Article. However,

214. See, e.g., John S. Carroll, How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and
Values, in Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement 43, 47 (Joel Slemrod
ed., 1992).

215. 1999 Treasury Report, supra note 7.
216. See I.R.C. § 6111 (d) (Supp. IV 1998) (requiring registration of a transaction with a
significant purpose of avoidance or evasion of federal income tax by a corporation, where
the transaction is offered under conditions of confidentiality and the promoter may receive a
fee that exceeds $100,000); see also Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 208.1, at
137-40 (describing the history of tax shelters, including the episode of aggressively marketed
individual tax products in the 1970s and 1980s); id. §§ 208.3.1-208.3.2.2, at 148-59
(outlining a 1994 law change that raised the opinion standard for corporate tax shelters for
purposes of the substantial understatement penalty in section 6664(c) of the Code and
outlining the 1997 change requiring registration of certain confidential transactions in
section 6111 (d) of the Code).
217. See Rice's Toyota World Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 203 & n.17, 209 (1983)
(indicating that a transaction should be respected as valid if it either has business purpose or
"possesses some modicum of economic substance"), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 752 F.2d
89 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Wolfnan, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, §§ 208.4, 208.4.1,
at 169-71 (noting the subjective business purpose element and objective profit motive
elements of economic substance inquiry).
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the discussion below outlines several of the more prominent cases and
attempts to give the mixed-results flavor of the litigation.
The government scored an early win in ACM Partnership v.
Commissioner, in which the Tax Court disallowed partnership losses
disproportionately allocated to Colgate Palmolive under a scheme involving
a product marketed by Merrill Lynch, a tax-indifferent partner, and a
2 18
technical interpretation of the contingent payment installment sale rules.
The ACM Partnershipcourt focused on the lack of an economic profit that
exceeded transaction costs in reaching its conclusion that the transaction
lacked economic substance, but failed to provide much detail regarding that
standard, including how much profit would be enough or whether the
economic substance and business purpose tests were independent. 2 19 The
220
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed.
Since ACM Partnership, the government has scored several trial and
appellate victories. The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Tax Court in
Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner that the taxpayer could not deduct
interest derived from the corporation's borrowing against life insurance
policies it owned on the lives of its employees. The court found that the
program lacked economic substance where the paid interest and fees
exceeded the policies' expected return, and the court also found no business
purpose. 2 2 1 In Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, the Second
Circuit upheld an unusual forty percent gross valuation misstatement
penalty assessed against Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) with
respect to a loss-generation partnership transaction that was based in part on
the false representation of LTCM that it had a valid business purpose for the
222
transaction.
Recently, the government has trumpeted several other wins-or, at least,
not losses-in tax shelter litigation. 2 23 The Fourth Circuit reversed a
district court's grant of summary judgment for the taxpayer in Black &
Decker Corp. v. United States, concluding that the court had to hear expert

218. See ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M (CCH) 2189 (1997), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
219. See Wolfinan, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 208.4.2, at 177-78 (analyzing
ACM Partnership).
220. See ACM P'ship, 157 F.3d at 263 (affirming the disallowance of noneconomic
losses).
221. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2001)

(accepting the tax court's finding that the program could not generate a pretax profit and that
program lacked any real business motive), affg 113 T.C. 254 (1999).
222. See Long-Term Capital Holdings v. United States, No. 04-5687, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20988 (2d Cir. Sept. 27, 2005) (per curiam), affg 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn.
2004).

223. See Senior IRS Officials Tout Tax Shelter Victories, Tax Notes Today, Sept. 15,
2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 179-1 (reporting officials' comments on the results in
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 440-43 (2006), Coltec Industries v.
United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), and TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States (Castle
Harbour),459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006), rev'g and remanding 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn.
2004)).
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witnesses and consider more carefully the IRS argument that the taxpayer
lacked an objective profit motive. 224 In Coltec Industries v. United States,
the Federal Circuit, reversing the Court of Claims, concluded that a
contingent liability transaction lacked economic substance, rejecting the
taxpayer's claim that assigning contingent asbestos liabilities to a different
subsidiary had business purpose. 225 In TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States
(Castle Harbour), the Second Circuit concluded that interests held in a
partnership by Dutch banks were debt interests, not equity interests-which
2 26
meant that the underlying tax shelter would not work as intended.
However, some of the government's earlier trial court victories were
reversed by appellate courts.
Two cases involving a taxpayer's
participation in a marketed and prepackaged foreign tax credit product
demonstrate the difficulty of deciding on a metric to use in computing pretax profit. In Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissionerand IES Industries
v. United States, the purchase of non-U.S. corporate stock (in the form of
American Depositary Receipts) immediately before the dividend record
date and the sale of the same stock immediately after the dividend record
date generated offsetting dividend income and capital loss and a bonus
foreign tax credit. 2 27 The lower courts concluded, after treating the foreign
tax as an expense, that there was not economic profit. 228 The Fifth and
Eighth Circuits concluded that a measure of pre-tax profit should not treat
foreign tax as an expense, and reversed the Tax Court.2 29 Another case
reveals courts' reluctance to disregard transactions with unrelated third
parties. In United ParcelService of America v. Commissioner, the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the Tax Court in respecting the taxpayer's transfer of its

224. See Black & Decker Corp., 436 F.3d at 440-43 (noting that Black & Decker had
stipulated for purposes of summary judgment that the transaction was solely tax-motivated
and criticizing the district court's failure to thoroughly consider IRS evidence tending to
show the lack of an objective profit motive). But see Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker in the
Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textualism, 111 Tax Notes 315, 325-26 (2006) (noting
that, despite its pro-government economic substance decision, the Fourth Circuit's textualist
approach to statutory interpretation of section 357 of the Code ignored secondary sources
and might encourage rigid technical readings of statutes by tax shelter designers).
225. See Coltec Indus., 454 F.3d at 1352-54 (discussing the economic substance issue).
226. See TIFD IIl-E, Inc., 459 F.3d at 241 (holding that Dutch banks held debt, not
equity).
227. See Wolfinan, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 208.4.3, at 182-83 (describing the
transactions at issue in Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner and IES Industries v.
United States).
228. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214, 223-25 (1999) (concluding
that the transaction lacked economic substance or business purpose), rev'd, 277 F.3d 778
(5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 1 50,470, available at
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22610 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (finding a sham transaction because of the
lack of any change in the taxpayer's economic position), rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 350 (8th
Cir. 2001).
229. See Compaq Computer Corp., 277 F.3d at 784-87 (eliminating the foreign tax
expense from profit calculation and using resulting pretax profit as evidence of economic
substance and business purpose); IES Indus., 253 F.3d, at 354-56 (reaching a similar result).
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excess value insurance business to a related Bermuda
corporation through a
2 30
reinsurance agreement with an unrelated firm.
Despite some recent elucidation in the government's favor, this mixed
case law does not draw a clear line between acceptable and unacceptable
transactions. Indeed, courts appear to disagree on the appropriate legal
standard: The cases fail to explain whether a transaction must possess both
23 1
business purpose and an objective profit motive in order to be sustained.
Legislation clarifying the economic substance standard is sometimes
proposed. 23 2 Prominent commentators, however, criticize this approach,
arguing that the limits of statutory drafting would result in an inferior
doctrine. 233 The government also no longer advocates economic substance
codification. 234 The IRS and Treasury have concentrated their regulatory
energies instead on articulating,
enforcing, and using information from a tax
'2 35
shelter "web of disclosure.
2. Defining Tax Shelters: The Academic Debate
In parallel with its litigation efforts, the IRS and Treasury embarked in
2000 on a regulatory assault on tax shelters that ultimately attempted to
clearly identify unacceptable tax shelters and to prevent taxpayers from
230. See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Comm'r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1018-20 (1lth Cir. 2001)
(emphasizing the participation of an unrelated firm and comparing the UPS transaction to the
form-of-entity or debt-versus-equity tax-influenced business decisions), rev'g 78 T.C.M.
(CCH) 262 (1999).
231. See Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, § 208.4.3, at 180 (noting that
"courts continue to struggle with whether a transaction needs to possess both a bona fide
non-tax business purpose and reasonable expectation of pre-tax profit to be sustained"); see
also Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 29 (2000)
(noting the complexity and uncertainty of the economic substance doctrine).
232. See, e.g., H.R. 4297, 109th Cong. §§ 411-13 (2006) ("clarifying" economic
substance and providing penalties for transactions without it); see also Lee A. Sheppard,
Economic Substance Update, 106 Tax Notes 1137, 1142 (2005) (noting that the Senate
included a draft of economic substance codification in its version of the budget
reconciliation bill, that the draft was "scored to bring in $15 billion over ten years," and that
the provision was expected to be deleted in reconciliation conference negotiations).
233. See, e.g., Eustice, supra note 213, at 164-65 (stating that the economic substance
doctrine is better left to the courts); Bernard Wolfman, Letter to the Editor, Why Economic
Substance Is Better Left Uncodifted, 104 Tax Notes 445, 445 (2004) ("There is no
shortcut."); see also Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1939, 1952-53 (2005) (arguing for the
disallowance of loss in excess of measurable net worth decrease but not for the codification
of the economic substance doctrine).
234. See, e.g., Patti Mohr, Senators Scrutinize "Peddlers" of Abusive Tax Shelters, Tax
Notes Today, Oct. 22, 2003, availableat LEXIS 2003 TNT 204-1 (noting the opposition of
the George W. Bush Administration to codification of economic substance because of
increased uncertainty and burdens on the IRS rulemaking process, and noting the comments
of Pamela Olson, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, at a hearing before the Senate Finance
Committee).
235. See Kenneth A. Gary, Treasury Official Discusses Reportable Transactions,
Disclosure Requirements, Tax Notes Today, Nov. 6, 2003, available at LEXIS, 2003 TNT
215-5 (noting comments of Eric Solomon, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Regulatory Affairs, describing a tax shelter policy based on a "web of disclosure").
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engaging in them. The effort to define tax shelters reveals the complex
schizophrenia of U.S. federal income tax law, under which some provisions
of law are nicely consistent with the theory of a realization-based income
tax and others are unabashed tax expenditures. Even if one can say that the
tax shelter rules aim at taxpayers who take wacky positions under rules
grounded (or which the government believes are grounded) in sensible
income tax policy, it is often hard to tell to which group a rule belongs.
Some commentators contend that a tax shelter definition should
diligently avoid encompassing transactions that have any business
element. 2 36 Another description focuses on the objective economic
substance of a transaction and considers transactions illegitimate if
economic losses (or gains) do not accompany tax losses (or gains) of
similar magnitude. 23 7 Some commentators focus on legislative intent,
rather than business or tax motive; 238 others would simply err on the side of
239
over-inclusiveness.
Another approach is to list the common features of tax shelters. This
method borrows from the tax motivated, economic substance, and
legislative intent concepts while bringing them down to a more practical
level. Professor Joseph Bankman's 1999 list included items such as
providing a tax loss with little risk of economic loss (an economic
substance concept); the presence of a tax-indifferent party (which suggests
that the tax-concerned party will be able to fulfill its tax-motivated strategy
without push back); and the presence of a flaw in the tax system that
mismatches economic and tax income (a factor relating to legislative
intent). 240 Professor James Eustice proposes a similar list, adding the
24 1
absence of economic profit prospects or business purpose.
Bankman and Eustice also include factors relating to the marketing or
promotion of tax shelters in their lists of characteristics, suggesting that
"prepackaged" transactions 24 2 and transactions suitable for use by more
than one taxpayer 24 3 are more likely to be tax shelters. These factors follow
from the insight that tax strategies that develop independently of a
taxpayer's particular business situation more likely lack business purpose or
economic substance. Bankman also lists the following factor: "[T]he
236. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, Commentary, Response to "Old 'Brine. in New Bottles"

(New Brine in Old Bottles), 55 Tax L. Rev. 397, 400 (2002) (proposing a narrow definition
of a tax shelter as a transaction that "would not have been entered into at all but for the
desire to claim tax benefits").
237. See Eustice, supra note 213, at 155-56 (describing mortgage pool swaps engineered
by Cottage Savings as legitimate because the accelerated loss was a real economic loss).
238. See Schler, supra note 6, at 331 (outlining a definition of a tax shelter).
239. See Pearlman, supra note 9, at 290 (proposing a definition for purposes of disclosure
of a transaction "if there is any possibility that the action does not comply with current
law").

240. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 Tax Notes
1775, 1777 (1999).

241. See Eustice, supra note 213, at 158-59.
242. See id. at 159.
243. See Bankman, supra note 240, at 1777.
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shelter is likely to be shut down by legislative or administrative change
soon after it is detected. ' 244 The government acted definitively on this most
pragmatic factor through its disclosure regulations, discussed below. And,
particularly with respect to listed transactions, tax regulators gave great
weight to promotion and marketing as a business purpose proxy.
3. The Web of Disclosure
The government first proposed tax shelter regulations in response to the
recent wave of corporate tax shelter activity in February 2000.245 Its initial
attempt featured a broad definition of tax shelter transactions and (due to a
lack of congressional action) 24 6 no penalties for nondisclosure. The
regulations were not as effective as the government had hoped. 247 After
several rounds of amendment, drafters arrived at a clearer and more specific
approach. The government also established the Office of Tax Shelter
Analysis dedicated to identifying and shutting down tax shelter
transactions.
Today, taxpayer disclosure requirements, material advisor reporting
obligations, and list maintenance obligations target five categories of
transactions:
(1) listed transactions, which are specific transactions
described by the IRS in quick-and-dirty notices designed to shut down the
transaction quickly without elaborate regulatory process; (2) confidential
transactions; (3) transactions that contractually require the return of an
adviser's fee if the desired tax outcome does not result; (4) loss
transactions; and (5) transactions with brief asset holding periods. 24 8 Under
a 2004 statute, specific penalties apply for nondisclosure. 249 In addition,

244. Id.
245. See T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.R.B. 747 (proposing corporate tax shelter disclosure
regulations); I.R.S. Announcement 2000-12, 2000-12 I.R.B. 1 (summarizing regulations).
246. Tax shelter disclosure and penalty provisions made it into a Senate Finance
Committee discussion draft in 2000. See Ryan J. Donmoyer & Heidi Glenn, Finance
Antishelter "Draft" Boosts Penalties, Standards of Conduct, Tax Notes Today, May 25,
2000, available at LEXIS, 2000 TNT 102-1 (May 25, 2000). Nevertheless, the provisions
did not appear in the final legislation.
247. See Larry R. Langdon, Langdon Testimony at Finance Committee Hearing on Tax
Shelters, Tax Notes Today, Mar. 21, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2002 TNT 56-20 (providing
testimony of then-IRS LMSB Commissioner Langdon that promoters interpreted the rules
narrowly and this interpretation resulted in inadequate disclosure).
248. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(1) (2006) (listing these categories); see also I.R.C. §
6111 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring material advisor reporting); Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1(a),
c(l) (requiring material advisor list maintenance). The list initially included transactions
with significant book-tax differences. That category has been removed as a result of the
development of a new and comprehensive Schedule M-3 describing book-tax differences on
corporate tax returns, which lays out book-tax differences for corporate tax returns in more
detail. See I.R.S. Notice 2006-6, 2006-5 I.R.B. 385.
249. See I.R.C. § 6707A (imposing penalties for the failure to include listed transactions
on returns and requiring the disclosure of certain penalties in an SEC report); id. § 6707
(imposing penalties on material advisors who fail to report listed transactions ranging from
$200,000 to fifty or seventy-five percent of the gross income that the material adviser
received with respect to the listed transaction); id. § 6708 (imposing on material advisors
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the government has established a policy of requesting all audit workpapers
from any taxpayer who has engaged in an undisclosed listed transaction,
echoing the Thompson memo's emphasis on cooperation to remedy
250
misbehavior.
The government's practices of discovering abusive transactions through a
focused tax shelter office and of labeling transactions as tax shelters by
"listing" them through immediately effective notices are central to its
disclosure strategy under these revised regulations. Notices have identified
about thirty transactions as shelters, 2 5 1 including shelters whose validity is
still being litigated. Listed transactions are typically marketed and
promoted products, and the government's tendency to consider "promotion"
252
as a litmus test for abusive tax shelters is public knowledge.
The government's strategy of specifically labeling promoted tax shelter
transactions as deviant behavior has apparently effectively translated into an
anti-tax shelter compliance norm. Government officials say taxpayers have
simply stopped engaging in the development or the use of such promoted
tax shelter products. 253 It is conceivable that government officials might
make such claims without adequate evidence, perhaps in order to enhance
others' views of their performance or in order to increase taxpayer
2 54
compliance by conveying the impression that most taxpayers comply.

penalties for failure to maintain or supply investor lists); see also id. § 6662(a) (imposing a
twenty percent penalty for certain underpayments); id. § 6700 (imposing a penalty on
promoters of fifty percent of the gross income derived by the promoter from certain
transactions). Other sanctions also follow from nondisclosure of reportable transactions. See
generally Wolfman, Holden & Harris, supra note 107, at 25-33 (Supp. 2006) (summarizing
penalties relating to tax shelters).
250. See I.R.S. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (announcing that IRS would
request all workpapers if a taxpayer engaged in a listed transaction and failed to disclose it
and would request workpapers relating to any disclosed listed transaction). This changed a
historically restrained IRS policy. See id. However, it has long been clear that the IRS can
enforce summonses of audit workpapers. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S.
805, 816-21 (1984) (requiring auditors to produce workpapers in response to IRS
summonses); see also I.R.C. § 7525(b) (providing that communications relating to
transactions with a significant purpose of federal income tax avoidance or evasion do not
enjoy the tax practitioner-client statutory privilege and cross-referencing I.R.C. §
6662(d)(2)(C)(ii)).
251. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-67, 2004-41 I.R.B. 600 (providing thirty listed transactions
posted as of Oct. 12, 2004).
The current list is posted on the IRS website at
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/article/0,,id=120633,00.html.
252. See GAO 2003 Report, supra note 208, at 4, 7 (stating that the IRS uses promoter
investigations to identify shelters and uses investor information to identify promoters); see
also Unofficial TranscriptIs Available of Forum on Tax Shelters, supra note 102 ("'I think
the key aspect of technical tax shelters is marketing."' (quoting Eric Solomon, Treasury
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulatory Affairs and Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Tax Policy)).
253. See supra note 4 (summarizing government officials' view that tax shelters are no
longer widely promoted to large corporations).
254. See, e.g., Frontline, supra note 117 ("'That's obviously an opinion which anyone
who defends the status quo is going to give-that things have changed. I don't buy it at
all."' (quoting Sen. Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan)).
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However, this approach would conflict with IRS and Treasury incentives
to support additional budget requests.
Moreover, other available
information corroborates the government officials' view. For example,
individuals who no longer work for the government agree that large
accounting firms no longer promote corporate tax shelters. 25 5 Practitioners
informally report that they do not currently observe the promoting and
marketing of tax shelter products to public corporations. And one firm,
KPMG, has explicitly agreed never to develop or market "prepackaged tax
products" again and to have an internal monitor verify
its compliance with
2 56
this (and other) requirements for at least three years.
Organizational behavior learning identifies ethical uncertainty as a factor
257
that causes large organization norms to veer toward aggressive behavior.
This factor suggests that the clarity of the tax shelter rules, particularly the
listed transaction rules, has contributed significantly to their success.
Although numerous other factors affect a regulator's choice between rules
and standards, this example suggests a reason to consider rules seriously
where the regulated party is a large organization. Perhaps the case is even
stronger where, as in the tax shelter case, a relatively clear litmus test
(promotion) is available and the regime is a disclosure regime, not an
25 8
automatic liability regime.
C. The New FASB Tax Benefit Accounting Standard
FASB's revisions to the standard for recording tax benefits and liabilities
for financial accounting purposes provide another example of the
responsiveness of public corporation tax decision-making groups to revised,
stricter rules. Under the long-standing standard, tax benefits were often
reduced only if it was more likely than not that future tax attributes (such as
net operating losses) would prevent their realization, and tax liabilities were
accrued for financial accounting purposes only if it was probable that they
would be successfully asserted by the government. 259 A standard proposed
in July 2005 would have added a presumption of government challenge and
shifted the burden of proof by permitting the recording of tax benefits only
255. See, e.g., id. ("'I think that the firms are sufficiently concerned about the reputational
damage of being in this tax shelter business. There is much less of an impetus for them to do
it on a going forward basis."' (quoting Pamela Olson, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy, 2002-2004)).
256. See KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 145, at 5, 19, 21-22.
257. See supra Part I.E.

258. See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
259. See James R. Browne, FinancialReporting for Uncertain Tax Positions, 109 Tax
Notes 77, 78-81 (2005) (explaining previous standards); see also Accounting for Income
Taxes, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109, §§ 8, 17(e) (Fin. Accounting Standards
Bd. 1992), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl09.pdf (providing that tax assets are

reduced by a valuation allowance if it is more likely than not that some of the tax assets will
not be realized); Accounting for Contingencies, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 5, § 8
(Fin. Accounting Standards

Bd.

1975),

available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas5.pdf

(requiring the accrual of loss contingencies (such as the possibility of increased taxes on
audit) if it is "probable" that the liability exists).
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if it was probable that, assuming the benefits were challenged by the
government, the government would lose. 260 The proposal drew significant
criticism from commentators who noted that the proposal might result in
accounting inaccuracies, in particular overreporting of liabilities or
underreporting of assets. 26 1 Commentators expected some softening and
extension of the effective date of the proposal. 262 Nevertheless, the pending
proposal caused some auditors to require a higher level of assurance than
before for the recording of a future tax benefit-that is, a "should" opinion
26 3
rather than a "more likely than not" opinion-before it was finalized.
FASB has since softened the proposed new standard to permit the
recording of future tax benefits if it is "more likely than not" that, assuming
they are challenged by the government, the government would lose. 2 64 This
standard is still tougher: It adds a presumption of government challenge
and shifts the burden of proof, though "more likely than not" is less
stringent than "probable." Tax director surveys show that tax departments
265
are devoting significant energy to compliance with the new standard.
V. NORM DEVELOPMENT AND TAX POLICY
This cultural story of the development of an anti-tax shelter norm raises
several broader points. First, it provides a framework to consider whether a

260. See Accounting for Uncertain Tax Positions-An Interpretation of FASB Statement
No. 109, Exposure Draft No. 1215-001 (Fin. Accounting Standard Bd.) (2005); Browne,
supra note 259, at 81-82 (explaining the proposed standard).
261. See, e.g., Browne, supra note 259, at 86 (stating that longstanding standard more
accurately reports tax assets and liabilities).
262. See J. Christine Harris, FASB to Delay Implementation of Uncertain Tax Position
Guidance Until 2006, Says SEC Official, Tax Notes Today, Nov. 7, 2005, available at
LEXIS, 2005 TNT 214-2 (reporting the comments of Brian Bullard that FASB planned to
relax the proposed standard and postpone its implementation). The original effective date of
the last quarter of 2005 was eventually pushed back a year to the first year beginning after
December 15, 2006. See Sirena J. Scales, FASB Agrees on New Effective Datefor Guidance
on Uncertain Tax Positions,Tax Notes Today, Jan. 12, 2006, availableat LEXIS, 2006 TNT
8-2. At least some tax directors expected the push back. See id.
263. See, e.g., Ken Gee, Audit Partner, BDO Seidman & Rob Terpening, Tax Partner,
BDO Seidman, Presentation at the San Jose State University/Tax Executives Institute High
Technology Tax Institute: Accounting Guidance Update (Nov. 8, 2005) (commenting that
different auditors have different standards and that some have tightened their standards as a
result of the proposed changes to Accounting for Income Taxes, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 109 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992)); see also KPMG Deferred
Prosecution Agreement, supra note 145, at 7 (describing the stipulation that KPMG accept a
heightened opinion standard). One survey also reports that financial statement disclosure
relating to uncertain tax positions had increased prior to the finalization of the new standard.
See TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 18 (reporting that sixty-three percent of respondents
report such disclosure has increased in the past two years).
264. See Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, FASB Interpretation No. 48, §§ 67 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006), availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fin%2048.pdf.
(outlining a more-likely-than-not standard).
265. See, e.g., TCPI 2006 Survey, supra note 1, at 37 (reporting that forty-one percent of
respondents cited, as the top tax group challenge, compliance with Accounting for Income
Taxes, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 109 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1992)).
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broader compliance norm, extending beyond promoted tax shelters, might
develop. Second, it provokes the question of how either a narrow anti-tax
shelter norm or a broader compliance norm could achieve permanence.
Third, it raises the issue of regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
A. How to Promote a BroaderNorm
1. The Existing Narrow Norm
The new tax compliance norm described in this Article is narrow:
Corporate tax decision makers are avoiding promoted tax shelters. The
question of whether a broader conservatism has developed remains open.
Some developments, such as accounting firms' adherence to the stricter
FASB rules in advance of their finalization or effective date, 266 point to a
broader tendency to give more conservative advice. In addition, there are
anecdotal reports of somewhat more conservative planning behaviors apart
from the avoidance of listed transactions. For example, firms doing
offshore tax planning may expect their Section 404 auditor and their
financial auditor to push back at the margins by demanding larger payments
in exchange for the transfer of existing technology overseas, suggesting
adjustments to intercompany transfer prices so they are slightly less
favorable to the corporation, and requiring completed paperwork
documenting intercompany agreements and checking to ensure that those
written agreements are followed more carefully in practice.
However, it goes too far to say that the tax shelter and Sarbanes-Oxley
exercise has generated a broader social norm of conservative corporate
taxpaying behavior. 267 One major area of continued big-ticket tax planning
shifts income to lower-tax offshore locations. 268 Another involves the use
of hybrid securities treated as interest-generating debt for tax purposes and

266. See supra Part IV.C.

267. Cf Kirsten A. Cook, G. Ryan Huston & Thomas C. Omer, Earnings Management
Through Effective Tax Rates:
Oxley Act of 2002, at

The Effects of Tax Planning Investment and the Sarbanes2 (June 2006) (unpublished paper), available at

http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=897749 (summarizing an empirical study result that effective
tax rate management is still observed post-Sarbanes-Oxley, although less so for firms that do
not purchase tax services from their auditors).
268. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Governments and Multinational
Corporations in the Race to the Bottom, 41 Tax Notes Int'l 459, 460-62 (2006) (noting
declines in effective tax rates from 1992 to 2002 due to offshore planning and identifying tax
reduction strategies including those involving hybrid securities and hybrid entities); see also
Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Check-the-Box Rules Not Sacred, Says Hicks, Tax Notes

Today, June 5, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 107-8 (noting that "[t]he Big Four
accounting firms are thought to have already compiled playbooks of [Controlled Foreign
Corporation] look-through gambits" in anticipation of section 954(c)(6) of the Code, a lookthrough rule which permits certain related-party income to be treated as active, non-subpart
F income).
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equity for other regulatory purposes. 269 Tax planners continue to pursue
patents for some tax-reduction ideas, a pattern that suggests some of the
same lack-of-business-purpose problems as tax shelter promotion. 2 70 Tax
decision makers may rely on unclear IRS guidance to reach aggressive
27 1 Meanwhile, the IRS keeps a list of current
conclusions in these areas.
2 72
compliance challenges.
2. The Carrot and the Stick
So how should the government build on the success of its campaign
against promoted tax shelters to increase taxpayer compliance in other
areas? The direct prescription, based on the case study discussed in this
Article, might read as follows: Expand the internal transparency and size of
the tax decision-making group, aggressively pursue enforcement programs
that affect each member of the group, and clearly label deviant transactions
in non-tax shelter areas. That is what appears to have worked for tax
shelters; why should it not work for hybrid financing transactions, offshore
planning, and other current areas of compliance concern?
IRS and Treasury leaders have spoken out regularly and thoughtfully on
issues of compliance and enforcement in recent years. They have notably
not focused exclusively on hard-nosed enforcement and scarlet-letter listing

269. See, e.g., Ivar Simensen & Richard. Beales, Vinci Raises e500m By Tapping New
Debt Market, Fin. Times (U.S.), Feb. 8, 2006, at 16 (reporting issuances of hybrid
instruments).
270. See Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 109th Cong., Background and Issues Relating
to the Patenting of Tax Advice 22-23 (Comm. Print. 2006), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-31-06.pdf (noting that the patent process may encourage the
development of marketable products by providing protection against duplication of a
patented structure without any requirement of disclosure under the tax shelter regulations
absent a contractual requirement of confidentiality).
271. See, e.g., Section 482: Methods to Determine Taxable Income in Connection with a
Cost Sharing Arrangement, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,116, 51,117-18 (proposed Aug. 29, 2005)
(describing the proposed "investor model" concept for arriving at arm's length prices for
intangibles transfers, which would attribute greater value to intellectual property (IP)
generated by U.S. parent corporations because it would attach value to those corporations'
"external contributions"); Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-34 I.R.B. 380 (permitting separate
treatment of debt and equity components of certain collateralized forward contracts, resulting
in an interest deduction for the issuer); see also Lee Sheppard, Is Apportionment the
Formulafor Intangible Development?, 108 Tax Notes 1093, 1093-98 (2005) (criticizing the
confusing state of existing and proposed transfer pricing regulations and recommending a
formulary apportionment approach); Lee Sheppard, News Analysis: Having it Both Ways on
Feline PRIDES, Tax Notes Today, Feb. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 25-4
(alleging that Rev. Rul. 2003-97 does not reconcile with I.R.C. § 163(1), which prohibits an
interest deduction for interest payable in equity).
272. See, e.g., Compliance Concerns Relative to Large and Mid-Size Businesses:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 5-8 (2006) (written testimony of Mark
at
available
Revenue),
of
Internal
Commissioner
Everson,
(listing
http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/testimony/2005test/061306testme.pdf
intangibles transfers, cost sharing, transfer pricing, abusive foreign tax credit, and hybrid
instrument or entity transactions as major global compliance concerns).
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tactics. Instead, they emphasize service in addition to enforcement. 273
According to the head of LMSB, the large-corporation division of the IRS,
the government's goal is to reach out to good-faith taxpayers and build
efficient working relationships marked by trust and cooperation, while
cracking down on bad-faith taxpayers. 274 Academics such as Professor Dan
Kahan have also endorsed this idea of different regulatory approaches
275
depending on the cooperation offered by regulated parties.
This Article's story about the development of a narrow tax shelter
compliance norm is a story about a stick, not a carrot (with some nuance;
for example, the tax shelter settlement programs offered might fit the carrot
mold). It clearly offers a useful model for other situations in which the IRS
wishes to clamp down on deviant transactions. In particular, the story
demonstrates the power of a group to reinforce compliance norms if all
members of the group have ample incentive to comply. This in turn
suggests the importance of enforcement on all fronts-with respect to tax
directors, their superiors within corporate organizations, and their advisors,
for example. The story also shows the particular power of clear rules to
promote compliance in a group norm situation.
One area where this approach may again prove effective is in the effort to
stop tax protesters, who claim a constitutional right to nonpayment of
income tax and currently face several well-publicized enforcement efforts.
This is not a large organization issue, and some of the behavioral patterns
discussed in this Article may consequently be muted. Nevertheless,
individuals in society are also susceptible to the development of group
norms, and the basic framework should be applicable. In the tax protester
situation, the government has established a clear rule by summarily
rejecting constitutional and other blanket arguments supporting nonpayment
of federal income taxes. 2 76 It has also tried to pursue enforcement actions
against both advisers and taxpayers, which may have a disproportionately

273. See, e.g., IRS Commissioner Mark W. Everson Statement on 2005 Enforcement &
Service Results, Tax Notes Today, Nov. 3, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 213-10

(emphasizing goals of service, modernization, and enforcement and reporting enforcement
results).
274. Telephone Interview with Deborah M. Nolan, Comm'r, IRS Large and Mid-Size
Bus. Div. (June 23, 2006).
275. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law,

102 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 83-84 (2003) (suggesting that governments should encourage the
reciprocal compliance behavior by emphasizing other taxpayers' compliance rather than the
possibility of audit, but should also punish "dedicated cheaters"); see also Ayres &
Braithwaite, supra note 53, at 26-27 (noting that regulators may use different tools
depending on whether regulated parties are inclined to compliance); Valerie Braithwaite, A
New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy 1, 2-4 (Valerie Braithwaite ed.,

2003) (describing the Australian compliance model under which "more social distance
between [taxpayers] and the [taxing] authority" corresponds to stricter, less flexible
regulatory strategies).
276. See Statement of Eileen J. O'Connor, supra note 133, at 16 (listing such "tax fraud"
schemes).
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strong effect on compliance by influencing more than one element of an
277
individual's tax decision-making group.
Other current compliance issues are more gray than black-and-white.
Take cost-sharing and offshore intellectual property transfers. The typical
plan in this case for a U.S. parent company involves locating valuable IP in
a low-tax offshore subsidiary and directing offshore profits to that IP
holding company.
One piece of this strategy involves structuring
intercompany payments among offshore subsidiaries to avoid pitfalls in
subpart F, which taxes a U.S. parent corporation on certain passive or
mobile income of its non-U.S. subsidiaries. 2 78 Another piece, a more
prominent current compliance target, involves the placement of intellectual
property in the IP holding company.2 79 The U.S. parent taxpayer benefits if
it can sell its existing IP to the IP holding company at a low price and
charge the IP holding company low future "cost-sharing" payments for the
non-U.S. interest in future IP, because the U.S. parent will recognize less
280
gain or income and will still wholly control the IP.
Recent proposed regulations attempt to address the problem of
underpricing intellectual property sent offshore by introducing the "investor
model" concept to force taxpayers to more fully recognize the value of the
U.S. parent corporation's contribution to the development of the IP when
setting these prices. 281 Recent enforcement efforts have alleged that some
firms have stepped over the line with respect to their intellectual property
valuations or cost-sharing methodology. 2 82 Is the government attempting to
develop a hard-nosed approach that labels aggressive IP pricing for offshore
transfers deviant and bad, just as it labeled promoted tax shelters deviant
and bad?
The government would be ill-advised to do so. Its stakeholders do not
show signs of willingness to accept such a label of deviance. The offshore
IP transfer situation is gray factually, because it depends (under current law)
on a facts-and-circumstances valuation exercise. It is gray from a policy

277. See id. at 16-17 (summarizing recent cases against promoters and taxpayers).
278. See Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, Taxes, Mar. 2004, at 29,
31-33 (providing an example of "plain-vanilla subpart F planning").
279. See id. at 32 (noting the usual recommendation to transfer income-generating
intangibles to a low-taxed foreign subsidiary using an arm's length "buy-in" payment for
existing intangibles and a cost-sharing arrangement for future intangibles).
280. See Keith Reams et al., Proposed Cost-Sharing Regulations: Are They a Realistic
Alternative?, 109 Tax Notes 239, 240 (2005) (noting the IRS concern that taxpayers
systematically undervalued buy-in payments and failed to enter into cost-sharing
arrangements similar to the arrangements of unrelated parties).
281. See Section 482: Methods to Determine Taxable Income in Connection with a Cost
Sharing Arrangement, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,116, 51,117-18 (proposed Aug. 29, 2005).
282. See, e.g., Xilinx Inc. v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 37, 52-53 (2005) (upholding a taxpayer's
omission of stock option costs from allocated costs under its transfer pricing agreement);
Audrey Nutt, Glaxo, IRS Settle Transfer PricingDisputefor $3.4 Billion, Tax Notes Today,
Sept. 12, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 176-1 (noting settlement with respect to U.S.
assertion that too little value was attributed to U.S. marketing intangibles and too much
profit was attributed to UK parent of GlaxoSmithKline).
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perspective, assuming one believes that U.S. parent corporations may invest
in non-U.S. subsidiaries (and outsource to them manufacturing or other IPdependent tasks). Enforcement efforts to tar certain aggressive taxpayers
283
have not produced government success. In particular, the U.S. Tax Court
and other nations' tax authorities, 284 seem to think the issues are gray.
3. Lessons for Gray Areas
If the lessons of this Article's tax shelter norm development story are
relatively clear for deviant transactions, like tax protester cases, they are
more subtle for gray areas, like offshore IP planning.
Consider first aggressive enforcement efforts. As Professor Kahan points
out, some empirical evidence suggests that broad-based enforcement can
lead taxpayers to believe that noncompliance is widespread, thus
encouraging them to cheat more. 2 85 Enforcement, he argues, is better
aimed at determined tax cheats than at taxpayers prepared to make a good
effort at compliance. 2 86 This view of enforcement suggests that in gray
areas, where the government believes that there are good taxpayers as well
as bad taxpayers, the government should separate good from bad, and adopt
different strategies for each.
Next consider the value of clear rules. The success of clear regulations
aimed at promoted tax shelters is not always transferable, because many
transactions are not "clearly deviant" but rather fall into a gray area. The
literature on the efficiency of "rules versus standards" demonstrates that
factors such as
clear rules are not always an appropriate solution, due to
288
7
possibly suffocating complexity 28 and ease of avoidance.
Commentators also persuasively argue that not all regulatory situations
are susceptible to rules. For example, some situations are too dependent on
endlessly varying facts and circumstances, 289 or do not permit a rule that
closes off close substitutions to taxpayer planning. 290 These problems may
be somewhat muted in the case of tax shelter regulation, because its status

283. See, e.g., Xilinx Inc., 125 T.C. at 52-53 (holding for the taxpayer).
284. See, e.g., Nutt, supra note 282 (noting that U.K. and U.S. competent authorities were
unable to reach agreement in the Glaxo case).
285. See Kahan, supra note 275, at 82-83 (attributing this phenomenon to "social
cueing").
286. See id. at 84 (stating that enforcement is appropriate for "dedicated cheaters").
287. See David A. Weisbach, Costs of Departuresfrom Formalism: Formalism in the

Tax Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 860, 867-69 (1999) (arguing that rules are systematically more
complex than standards, particularly in the tax area where rules that overlook uncommon
similar transactions may drive taxpayers to engage in those overlooked transactions).
288. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L.

Rev. 1312, 1323-26 (2001) (arguing that the success of a tax rule depends in large part on
the nature of the "friction" a taxpayer will experience in an effort to avoid it).

289. Distinguishing between debt and equity provides a classic tax example.
290. See Schizer, supra note 288, at 1324 (noting that the difficulty of avoiding a rule
must be significant and inflexible for the rule to be effective).
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as a disclosure regime may mean that over-inclusiveness does not carry any
29 1
direct liability for appropriate transactions.
The ability of clear rules to translate relatively smoothly into
organizational norms constitutes a factor in favor of rules instead of
standards in the large corporation context. But there remain many areas
where standards, not rules, provide the right approach. In these cases, the
recognition that vague standards present a challenge for the development of
a large organization compliance norm should prompt the government to use
different strategies to help organizations draw responsible lines.
Finally, consider the expanded and more transparent tax decision-making
group at public corporations. If a more cooperative, nonenforcement
strategy is appropriate for good-faith taxpayers, and if some situations
require standards-based regulation under which organizations must draw
lines, how should the government think about the instrumental largecorporation tax decision-making group? The smart regulatory route would
harness the potential strength of the group, just as the multifaceted
enforcement and clear rule combination harnessed its strength and
amplified the compliance tendencies of its members in the case of promoted
tax shelters.
Some proposals to encourage compliance in areas beyond the marketed
tax shelter arena rely on gatekeeper policing and try to increase the
visibility and reputational costs of bad advice. For example, Professor
Linda Beale has recently made just such a proposal to improve tax
practitioners' compliance ethic. She suggests raising the standard for a
return filing position and removing attorney-client privilege protection for
292
pre-filing advice.
Tax regulators have pursued some efforts to improve gatekeeper ethics,
most notably the amendments to Circular 230.293 But they have also more
directly tried to influence large corporations' tax decision-making
processes. Several recent initiatives rely on more, and earlier, direct
communication between the government and the tax decision makers at
large corporations. The programs try to select good-faith corporate
taxpayers and put a government representative in direct communication
with tax decision makers at the tax decision-making stage. 2 94 The issues
subject to resolution include gray areas such as the offshore IP transfer
example discussed above.

291. See Pearlman, supra note 9, at 303-04 (arguing for a broad tax shelter disclosure
standard).
292. See Beale, supra note 4, at 638 (summarizing her proposal).
293. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing Circular 230).
294. See Cliff Jemigan, Corporate Tax Audit Survival: A View of the IRS Through
Corporate Insider Eyes 71-78 (2005) (describing pre-filing agreements regarding factual
issues, industry issue resolution agreements, and CAP, as well as measures designed to
streamline the audit and appeals process).
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The flagship "real time audit" initiative, 295 called the Compliance
Assurance Program (CAP), targets certain large corporations 29 6 and
involves an agreement executed by the government and the taxpayer, which
identifies the goals of the CAP relationship. 297 In almost all cases, top
management signs off on the IRS presence. 298 In its pilot year, seventeen
large corporations accepted IRS invitations to participate in CAP. 299 The
CAP program anticipates "extensive cooperation between the Service and
participating taxpayers." 300 Its goal is to resolve all material issues before
the filing of a return, in which case the IRS pledges that it will not audit the
30 1
return filed in accordance with the agreement.
The CAP early issue resolution program is a conscious government effort
to take advantage of the compliance-oriented environment that currently
prevails inside public corporations, including expanded and more
transparent tax decision-making groups. 30 2 It is consistent with an
organizational behavior insight: A tax group that invites the IRS to
participate in its decision making is more likely to develop and sustain
strong tax compliance norms. This creative approach has achieved
preliminary success 303 and deserves continued support.
The CAP program and similar initiatives differ radically in tone and
approach from the disclose-and-settle-or-we'll-get-you tax shelter
regulatory approach. CAP's approach is a carrot. The head of LMSB
describes it as a mutually beneficial trade of transparency for certainty
within the context of a cooperative regulatory relationship. 30 4 The tax
shelter approach is a stick. Government commentators express their anger
30 5
at participants in tax shelters and their determination to exact penalties.

295. Donald L. Korb, Korb Discusses "Coming Revolution" in Large CorporateExams,
Tax Notes Today, Jan. 24, 2006, at pt. E.5, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 16-23.
296. See Jernigan, supra note 294, at 76-77 (explaining that the IRS has invited taxpayers
with "a history of honest dealings" to participate in CAP and anticipating that participation
in CAP will eventually be recognized as a badge of quality and integrity).
297. See Nolan, supra note 117, at 28 (describing a Memorandum of Understanding
between the IRS and a taxpayer).
298. Telephone Interview with Deborah M. Nolan, supra note 274.
299. See Dustin Stamper, Korb Hails Dispute Resolution, Electronic Filing as Future of
IRS, Tax Notes Today, Dec. 9, 2005, available at LEXIS, 2005 TNT 236-3 (describing the
IRS hopes for CAP program).
300. I.R.S. Announcement 2005-87, 2005-50 I.R.B. 1144.
301. See id. (stating that the IRS will accept a tax return consistent with CAP resolutions).
302. See Nolan, supra note 117, at 28 (noting that the IRS development of CAP emerged
from an examination of "ways to leverage the increased corporate governance and SEC
reporting requirements occasioned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act").
303. See id. at 30 (stating that the CAP program produced thirteen issue resolution
agreements, eleven in-process issue resolution agreements, and one full acceptance letter in
its first pilot year).
304. Telephone Interview with Deborah Nolan, supranote 274.
305. See, e.g., Statement of Eileen J. O'Connor, supra note 133, at 14 ("The Division also
prosecutes persons who promote or use fraudulent tax shelters and other schemes to evade
taxes and hide assets.").
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Despite this difference, the tax shelter story and the CAP story belong in
the same organizational behavior book. In the tax shelter case, the
existence of a larger, more transparent tax decision-making group amplified
the consistent, clear message of the tax shelter regulations and
contemporaneous tax and securities enforcement efforts, such that all those
involved focused on compliance, at least in the promoted tax shelter area.
The CAP program more explicitly targets this decision-making group by
seeking to get the IRS invited to its table, before the tax return is filed. But
both approaches leverage the larger and more transparent post-SarbanesOxley tax decision-making group. While the tax shelter example provides a
regulatory model, in tax and other areas, for deviant transactions susceptible
to rules and for deviant taxpayers responsive to enforcement, the CAP
example provides a regulatory model for gray-area transactions susceptible
to standards and good-faith taxpayers responsive to cooperative regulatory
efforts.
B. How to Address Norm Cyclicality
1. A Permanent Anti-Tax Shelter Norm?
On the evidence we now have, there is little reason to expect a permanent
uptick in corporate tax compliance, even with respect to the relatively
narrow issue of tax shelters. Commentators have previously observed a
historical cycle of fraud, crackdown, compliance, a shift of focus from
enforcement to service, and then more fraud. 30 6 The observed recent
increase in compliance with respect to tax shelters may simply represent a
reaction to the "crackdown" portion of the cycle. 30 7 In addition, the listed
transaction rules will no longer deter tax shelter participation if they fail to
seek out and list new promoted transactions. Enforcement and rule
currency are two important elements of maintaining the current tax shelter
compliance norm.

306. See Joel Slemrod & Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves: A Citizen's Guide to the Debate
over Taxes 183-85 (3d ed. 2004) (noting provisions in the 1998 Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act that imposed new requirements on the IRS in response to
popular perception that the IRS often acted unfairly or unethically, and also noting an
increase in IRS customer service efforts, apparently at the expense of enforcement); Bryan
T. Camp, Tax Administration as InquisitorialProcess and the PartialParadigmShift in the

IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 79 (2004) (noting the debate
over "pendulum" swings between service and enforcement at the IRS in the wake of the
1998 Act); see also William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank Is to Own One 247-48,
263 (2005) (noting the importance of studying and understanding fraud mechanisms,
including waves of fraud, and pointing out the importance of norms as potential fraud
restraints).
307. Frontline, supra note 117 ("'I think this thing is going to rebound, especially as the
economy improves."' (quoting Charles Rossotti, IRS Commissioner, 1997-2002)); id. ("'I
think what the IRS clearly has to do is to remain vigilant in this area. Because I think that if
they let down their guard there is at least the risk that we will see a return to this kind of
activity."' (quoting Pamela Olson, Treasury Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, 2002-2004)).
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Part III of this Article attributes the increased interest in compliance to
top executives' and tax specialists' fear of enforcement action. Without
continued reminders of the government's view and determination to enforce
it, compliance programs that look good on paper can falter as effective
regulatory tools, as regulated parties respond to a reduced economic
incentive to comply, perceive that other taxpayers may not comply, and
interpret uncertain areas of the law to further their own self-interest. 30 8 The
government appears to be well aware of this risk. The IRS and Treasury,
30 9
together with federal prosecutors, have clearly prioritized enforcement.
They must continue to do so.
Of course, the government cannot control the success of its enforcement
program. It faces considerable litigation hazards. The use of the Thompson
memo to turn employers against employees, the criminal fraud and
conspiracy theory of the KPMG tax shelter case, and the alleged invalidity
of various tax products may not stand up in court. The perceived violation
of KPMG personnel's constitutional rights in connection with the pending
criminal case, 3 10 for example, could generate an anti-government outcry
similar to the perception of unethical IRS behavior that prompted the 1998
Act. In addition, continued enforcement efforts aimed at senior corporate
executives often fall outside the tax context and beyond the jurisdiction of
the IRS, Treasury, or the Tax Division of the Justice Department.
With respect to rule currency, the IRS and Treasury should treat the tax
shelter regulations as a living document. The Office of Tax Shelter
Analysis provides a good institutional forum to filter suggestions for
additional listed transactions. In addition, the government's conscious
keeping of lists of areas of compliance concern, 3 11 its consideration of
issues such as the proper treatment of patented transactions, 3 12 and its
apparently close examination of the new, more detailed Schedule M-3s
showing corporate book and tax differences 313 all indicate that the
government devotes considerable energy to keeping these rules current.

308. See Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 306, at 185 (describing the economic incentive
and the perception of wider noncompliance risks of enforcement decline following 1998
Act); Eustice, supra note 213, at 160-62 (writing that "meaningful" audits should be the
government's top priority); Bernard Wolfman, Letter to the Editor, Now Is Not the Time for
IRS Enforcement to Ease Up, 109 Tax Notes 1105, 1105 (2005) (urging continued
commitment of government resources to enforcement); see also Krawiec, supra note 42, at
528-34 (arguing that legal compliance professionals and regulated business organizations
interpret incomplete law to further their own self-interest).
309. See, e.g., Dustin Stamper, Everson Says IRS Could Collect up to $100 Billion More
Per Year, Tax Notes Today, Feb. 16, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT 32-1 (reporting

the IRS Commissioner's comment that IRS enforcement efforts have already significantly
narrowed the tax gap and his request for additional enforcement funding).
310. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
311. See, e.g., Everson, supra note 272, at 5-10 (listing areas of compliance concern).
312. See supra note 270 (citing a congressional hearing on patented transactions).
313. See Crystal Tandon, More Than 200 Returns Targeted on Basis of Schedule M-3
Data, IRS Official Says, Tax Notes Today, July 12, 2006, available at LEXIS, 2006 TNT
133-4 (reporting on IRS use of M-3 data).

2006]

TAX SHELTER COMPLIANCE

1015

Enforcement strength and rule currency feed into the tax decision-making
groups to foster a tax shelter compliance norm. Without them, the current
norm may falter. The dependence of the current norm on continued
enforcement and rule clarity follows in part from the deviant nature of the
transactions targeted. There should be no assumption, in other words, that
the targets of tax shelter regulation have internalized a lasting social norm
of compliance.
2. Making a Broader Tax Compliance Norm Permanent
Part V.A.3 above suggests that broadening a tax compliance norm into
gray areas will benefit from a cooperative approach, like the IRS takes in its
early-issue-resolution initiatives such as CAP. Such initiatives attempt to
use cooperative and frank discussion, not enforcement and clear rules, to
encourage compliance. They assume a population of good-faith taxpayers,
not deviant tax avoiders.
The above discussion in Part V.B. 1 argues that the preservation of a tax
shelter compliance norm for determined tax avoiders depends on continued
enforcement and rule clarity for effective policing of deviant taxpayers.
What determines whether a compliance norm emerging from CAP and
similar programs will survive among good-faith taxpayers?
As with the tax shelter regulations, the cooperative initiatives will
continue to have effect only if their elements are maintained. These
initiatives, however, use different tools than the tax shelter regulations. In
addition to relying on enforcement of penalties against deviant taxpayers, as
in the shelter area, they depend on the development of a responsible and
responsive relationship between IRS personnel and the taxpayer. IRS
personnel must do their part to build and maintain such good government
relationships.
In addition, perhaps CAP has the capacity to foster a stronger tax
compliance norm incorporated into the large corporation's de facto ethical
code, as well as a stronger cooperation norm for government staff.3 14 Such

internalized social norms might not withstand an extended or egregious
breach of trust, but they could help sustain a compliance pattern through
lesser difficulties.
Cliff Jernigan, a seasoned tax director and tax
practitioner who served as a senior member of the LMSB IRS team when
CAP was adopted, writes,
I predict that CAP will become the favored filing process by large
companies. Quality taxpayers will want to tell others in their industry that
they are viewed as good taxpayers by using the CAP process. Company
CEOs will want their companies in the CAP program because it, like the
Malcolm Baldridge Quality Award,
will signify a quality company known
for its honesty and fair dealing. 3 15

314. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text (discussing legal and social norms).
315. Jernigan, supra note 294, at 77.
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Perhaps CAP participation will come to provide a clear and visible signal of
honesty, encouraging others (such as prospective business partners and
employees) to deal with CAP corporations. 3 16 Perhaps such positive
feedback will foster the internalization of a corporation tax compliance
norm, under which individuals within a corporation feel pride in tax
compliance and guilt as a result of noncompliance. 3 17 Theories relating to
the development of internalized social norms within organizations tie into
individual psychology, 3 18 as well as large-organization behavioral
theory, 3 19 and a full examination of these ideas is not attempted here. This
Article simply suggests that the CAP program may open the door to the
development of a tax compliance norm that is inherently stronger and more
lasting than the current narrow tax shelter compliance norm. Time will tell
if CAP succeeds.
C. Is the Norm Worth the Cost?
A complete cost-benefit analysis of the observed tax compliance norm is
beyond the scope of this Article. 320 Nevertheless, this section offers several
preliminary observations and attempts to suggest the complexity of the
exercise.
There are at least seven significant elements: the benefit of additional tax
revenues; the benefit of deterring undesirable transactions that taxpayers
declined to enter into due to concern about adverse tax outcomes; the cost
of deterring valid tax planning; the cost of deterring frank attorney-client
consultation as a result of the erosion of the attomey-client privilege; the
cost of additional monitoring under Sarbanes-Oxley, including external
Section 404 audits and independent board committees; the cost of tax and
securities enforcement; and the cost of researching and drafting new rules.
The CAP program and similar initiatives involve additional commitments
of government resources, including significant IRS personnel time.

316. See Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 1781, 1794-95 (2000) (describing tax compliance norm signaling theory).
317. See Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLaw for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1664 (1996)

(describing characteristics of an internalized norm).
318. See id. at 1661-62 (discussing moral reasoning and emotional response as avenues
for the internalization of norms).
319. See supra Part I.
320. The IRS does not typically engage in the cost-benefit analysis required of some other
agencies under Executive Order 12,866, typically taking the position that the rulemaking is
not a "significant regulatory action," meaning, among other things, that it will not have an
annual economic effect of $100 million or more. See Executive Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735, 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993) (defining "significant regulatory action"); see, e.g., T.D. 9165,
2005-4 I.R.B. 357 (concluding that finalized Circular 230 regulations were not a significant
regulatory action); cf Edward Sherwin, The Cost-Benefit Analysis of FinancialRegulation:

What the SEC Ignores in the Rulemaking Process, Why It Matters, and What to Do About It,
12 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 84-92, on file with the Fordham
Law Review) (arguing that the SEC should conduct cost-benefit analysis like many other
U.S. agencies and like its U.K. financial regulatory counterpart).
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Each of these elements presents its own estimation challenges. For
example, the payment of taxes to the government represents not an increase
in economic activity, but rather a transfer that hopefully promotes a more
efficient and equitable tax system. 32 ' Enforcement has the capacity to
emphasize that deviant taxpayers, while unusual, are firmly dealt with
(which would be expected to increase other taxpayers' compliance) or to
suggest that noncompliance is widespread (which would be expected to
decrease other taxpayers' compliance). 32 2 Commentators also debate the
importance of "good" tax planning, differing on the key question of the
extent to which such planning guides taxpayers away from traps in the law
323
that would result in taxpayer-adverse results contrary to legislative intent.
of
Commentators further challenge the traditional assumption that erosion
324
the attorney-client privilege deters frank attorney-client conversations.
Measuring the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley, rule making and enforcement are
daunting and inexact tasks. Moreover, only a portion of the SarbanesOxley and enforcement costs should be attributed to tax compliance efforts.
It is also possible that a less expensive form of, for example, Section 404
could support an equally effective expanded and transparent tax decisionmaking group. 32 5 Finally, the net cost of the CAP program and similar
programs is likely to be known only after it has run for a number of years,
since the benefit of avoiding later tax audit-related costs will offset the
initial investment in the program.
CONCLUSION

Regulators of large corporations and other organizations can profitably
use the organizational behavior insights offered by this Article. The Article
observes three factors that contribute to a currently observed anti-tax shelter
321. See Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 306, at 183 (noting that increased tax revenue
does not represent increased economic activity).
322. See Kahan, supra note 275, at 83 (noting empirical evidence that widely publicized
enforcement campaigns decrease compliance, but acknowledging that punishment of deviant
taxpayers is necessary to shore up any social norm of compliance for others); Posner, supra
note 316, at 1790-91 (positing that increasing enforcement can weaken the value of the
compliance signal for those who comply with the law although it will encourage compliance
for those who evaluate the compliance decision on an economic basis rather than a social
norm signaling basis).
323. Compare Daniel N. Shaviro, Evaluating the Social Costs of Corporate Tax Shelters,
55 Tax L. Rev. 445, 450-51 (2002) (arguing that resources are over-allocated to tax
planning), and Weisbach, supra note 212, at 222-25 (asserting that tax planning is a negative
externality although acknowledging that planning to avoid taxpayer-adverse mistakes in the
law may have value), with Hariton, supra note 236, at 400 (suggesting that the anti-taxshelter agenda should not target "tax-motivated structuring of legitimate business
transactions"), and Schler, supra note 6, at 386 ("If... Weisbach really means that his
objection does not apply to taxpayers who take advantage of [Congressionally intended] tax
incentives ... the exceptions clearly swallow the rule.").

324. See, e.g., Beale, supra note 4, at 663-64 (labeling the traditional argument
unpersuasive).
325. Cf Grundfest, supra note 80, at 11 (offering an amended Section 404 standard that
would limit the rule's concern to more material events).
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compliance norm at large corporations: an expanded and more transparent
decision-making group, enforcement and publicity efforts directed at every
member of that group, and clear rules. These three factors provide a
blueprint for the deterrence of clearly deviant transactions.
The tax shelter story also offers the more general lesson that attention to
the behavioral dynamics of decision-making groups can strengthen
regulatory efforts. In gray areas, where regulated parties may be acting in
good faith and/or where broad regulatory standards, rather than clear rules,
are appropriate, behaviorally sensitive regulation may involve government
efforts to participate directly in such decision-making groups, as with the
IRS CAP program. The experience of these two different approaches to
influencing tax decisions within large corporations can inform and assist
regulators in non-tax areas as well.

